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Footnotes1. See Whistleblower Reinforcement Act of 1998 (D.C. Act 12-398; to be codified at D.C. Code §_ ) App.B, Doc.3. 2. D.C. Code §1-1181.1, et seq. 3. D.C. Code §1-615.1, et seq. 4. Since 1975, when home rule legislation went into effect, the Mayor has had appointment power, subject to Council confirmation. The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Dec. 24, 1973, 87 Stat. 820 (D.C. Code §1-242). This appointment authority was modified by the passage of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 1 16, as amended, which created the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (the "Control Board"), which has powers of removal and broad oversight jurisdiction over District affairs. In April, 1997, a coalition of District officials, including the Chairman of the Council, the Chief Judge of the Superior Court, the United States Attorney, and the Vice-Chair of the Control Board, signed a Memorandum of Understanding which provides for management oversight of the Police Department, and more recently signed an updated memorandum providing for ongoing management oversight. The Mayor named the new Chief of Police with the concurrence of the signatories. 5. Shortly before publication of this Report, on September 9, 1998, Chief Ramsey announced a Department-wide restructuring of the Department. 6. See MPD Reorganization Plan, App. H. Doc. 1. 7. See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An Overview, 40 N.Y. Sch. L. Rev.73,79 (1995) (referring to "'code of silence' that keeps honest cops silent about the misdeeds of their colleagues"); The City of New York Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, Commission Report 53 (1994) ("Mollen Commission") (reporting "Blue Wall of Silence" in NYPD); Herman Goldstein, Police Corruption: A Perspective on Its Nature and Control 6 (Police Foundation 1975). 8. General Order 201.26, App. B. Doc. 1. 9. On September 25, 1997, Sergeants Hill and Senders testified before the Council's Committee on Government Operations about retaliation that they allegedly faced for refusing to falsify the time and attendance records of a former member of the Mayor's security detail. Their testimony was a major factor in the Council's decision to establish the Special Committee. 10. The other clerk refused to enter time for Walltower altogether. 11. Walltower declined to be interviewed by Special Counsel asserting, on the advice of counsel, his Fifth Amendment rights. 12. The Special Committee is not suggesting that the officers of the Seventh District are in any way deficient. To the contrary, the Seventh District includes some of the city's most troubled neighborhoods, and the officers there are widely considered to be among the hardest working and most proficient on the MPD. Nevertheless, because of its high concentrations of crime, the Seventh District is considered by many in the MPD to be one of the less favorable assignments. The current Seventh District Commander acknowledged this fact during his testimony before the Special Committee. 13. D.C. Code §1-616.3, App. B. Doc. 2. 14. See App. B. Doc. 3. 15. Compare Section 1554 of the "Whistleblower Reinforcement Act of 1998 ," signed by the Mayor on June 23, 1998 (D.C. Act 12-398; to be codified at D.C. Code §_ ) to 5 U.S.C. §1214(b)(4)(B). 16. This problem is analyzed at length in Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity 63-72 (1996). 17. See. e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 18. See App. B. Doc. 4. 19. This figure is down from a high of fifty sworn officers in 1997. 20. The investigator can recommend not hiring the applicant at any time during the process, upon finding sufficient negative information. Once that decision has been made, the applicant is given certain appeal rights. 21. 1997 Status Report at 1, App. C, Doc.1. 22. The 1999 budget authorized a sworn force of 3,600. With its current complement of 3,555 officers, the MPD is much closer to its full strength under the new budget. 23. Omnibus Bill, chapter 6. 24. One witness testified that there have been periods of time when the MPD has done no recruiting at all. The Special Committee believes that the MPD recruiting efforts must be year round. 25. Omnibus Bill at chp. 1, §I(a)(6) (chapter 6 of report). 26. 1997 Status Report at 3-4, App. C, Doc. 1. 27. Omnibus Bill at chp. 1, § I(a)(8) (chapter 6 of report). 28. The Special Committee requested that Cornelius Behan, who recently retired as the Director of the Maryland Department of Law Enforcement, conduct an evaluation of the MPD's training program. A copy of Mr. Behan's report is contained in the Appendix. App. C, Doc. 2. 29. Interim Chief Proctor testified that the recruits were performing only support functions. After her testimony, the Special Counsel wrote to interim Chief Proctor and expressed concern about the discrepancy between her testimony and the facts of the recruits' work arrangements. The letter requested that interim Chief Proctor explain or justify the discrepancy. Proctor did not respond, and this matter was brought to the attention of the Executive Assistant Chief of Police who has assured the Special Committee that this situation would not occur in the future. Proctor retired from the Department in September 1998. 30. The in-service training program is governed by General Order 404.6. (App. C, Doc. 3) The Special Committee recommends that the General Order be amended, as needed, to reflect the policy changes suggested below. More importantly, however, it appears that the current General Order is not followed. For example, the General Order provides that the director of training is responsible for the in-service training program. Yet, testimony revealed that the director of training has little input over the quantity or substance of current in-service training efforts. Additionally, the record-keeping provisions of the General Order are flagrantly ignored. MPD management must do a better job of ensuring compliance with whatever laws, regulations or policies are in effect. 31. December 1997 Report on Training at 1. App. C, Doc. 4. 32. Omnibus Bill at chp. 1, §3 (chapter 6 of report). 33. Sworn members must requalify according to the following schedule. Members of the rank of Sergeant and below must qualify twice per year while members at the rank of Lieutenant or above must qualify only once per year. General Order 901.1, App. C, Doc. 5. The Special Committee's investigation revealed that a majority of the MPD had failed to qualify according to that schedule. 34. December 1997 Report on Training at 1, App. C, Doc. 4. 35. Id. 36. General Order 901.1, App. C, Doc. 5. 37. See, e.g., Special Order 96.6, App. C' Doc. 6 (Special Order relating to discipline that has been in effect for more than 16 months). 38. This overtime represents gross expenditures and is not adjusted for reimbursements the MPD receives for grant funds and other payments from the federal government. 39. See Table: Overtime, App. D, Doc.1; Chart: Overtime Trends (Dollars) FY 1993-97 (chart), App. D, Doc.2. 40. See Chart: Overtime Trends (Dollars): Court. Budgeted, Total, FY 1993-97, App. D, Doc. 3. 41. PD 140, App. D, Doc. 4. 42. PD 168, App. D, Doc. 5. 43. .MOU. App. D, Doc. 6 44. Administrative/Investigative CANS, App. D, Doc. 7. 45. For a description and demonstration of TACIS operations, see App. D, Doc. 8. 46 See App. D, Doc. 9. 47. In October 1997, Corboy testified before the Council Committee on the Judiciary on his study of overtime. Like the September 1997 testimony of Hill and Sanders, Corboy's testimony contributed to the Council's decision to establish the Special Committee. 48. Currently, commanders are not apprised of their overtime budget for fear that, if the budgets were known, they would automatically be expended. Coard indicated, however, that the MPD is considering sharing some of this budgetary information with commanders in order to improve overtime planning. The Special Committee believes that a confidential budget does not assist commanders to plan overtime details and fix their own overtime budgets. It is recommended that the overtime budget information be shared with the commanders. 49. Overtime Approval Form, App. D, Doc. 10. 50. Another subject of concern to the Special Committee was the policy concerning the payment of overtime expenses for police security at special events such as the MCI Arena, movie detail, community events. etc. While MPD policy ordinarily requires private entities to pay for police security, application of the policy has been inconsistent. The Special Committee recommends that MPD review this matter and adopt, publish and follow a consistent written policy. 51. As discussed earlier in this report, perhaps as a result of these concerns, the MPD lowered the authorized force to 3,600 in the FY 1999 budget. 52. See Omer testimony, App. D, Doc. I I. 53. This report is not concerned, for the most part, with non-police related off-duty employment. Police-related employment is any job which is conditioned on membership in the MPD and potential use of a service weapon (i.e., Security Services). 54. General Order 201. 17, App. D, Doc. 12. 55. General Order 201.17, App. D, Doc. 12. 56. PD 180, App. D, Doc. 13; PD 180-B, App. D, Doc. 14. 57. PD I 80-A, App. D, Doc. 15. 58. Winn Management required MPD members to complete a separate employment application and submit to a drug test. However, these officers submitted the paperwork only after Adamany selected them to work. 59. Adamany PD 180, App. D, Doc. 16. 60. MCP Labor Agreement, Art. 27, Section E, 11 7, App. D, Doc. 17. 61. IACP Policy, App. D, Doc. 18. 62. For materials on Boston's "paid detail" system, see App. D, Doc. 19. 63. These terms were coined by Professor Albert J. Reiss, Jr. in his study of off-duty employment for the National Institute of Justice. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., National institute of Justice, Private Employment of Public Police 3 ( 1988). He described three models for off-duty employment: Officer Contract (officers contract directly with employers), Union Brokerage (unions control off-duty employment), and Department Contract (department contracts directly with private employers). The MPD employs the first model, which of the three, presents the least regulation of off-duty employment. 64. Fairfax General Order 340. App. D, Doc. 20. 65. For a breakdown of ABC Establishments that employ MPD officers, see App. D, Doc. 21. 66. MCP Labor Agreement Act 27, §F. ¶9, App. D, Doc. 17.For a breakdown of ABC Establishments that employ MPD officers, see App. D, Doc. 21. 67. Fairfax General Order 340, App. D, Doc. 20. 68. Mr. Eric Coard, MPD's current CFO, was unaware of the request and promised the Special Committee that he would review the issue and provide an update. 69. Under the old system each car needing collision repair would be subject to its own purchase order and cars would be out of service from 3-6 months. 70. In order to control costs, FMD retains an appraiser to provide an estimate of repair costs. Vendors usually come in under the estimate. On those occasions when the costs exceed the estimate, FMD will try to negotiate with the vendor to reduce the price. 71. Currently, the MPD has a supply inventory in excess of $350,000. MPD officials are working to reduce that figure to $125,000. The Special Committee assumes that the BPAs with parts vendors will be placed on the MRS system, thereby allowing FMD to better control its parts inventory. 72. The MPD currently owns 275 motorcycles. 73. A vehicle maintenance officer is the officer. at each unit who is charged with the responsibility of maintaining the unit's fleet. The VMO acts as a liaison with FMD and should be aware of and report any problems with the fleet. 74. Chart, Real vs. Ideal Automobile Distribution, App. E, Doc. 1. 75. The MPD has received an additional $3 million from federal Management Reform Funds toward the purchase of new vehicles. The MPD already has received 88 1997 Ford Crown Victoria models and expects to receive approximately 75 1999 Ford Taurus vehicles through GSA in the coming weeks. 76. Some witnesses testified that working through GSA is not efficient and that the MPD could have received a competitive price and had delivery much sooner by working directly with local dealers. As noted above, the Special Committee believes that as the MPD improves its procurement capabilities with the assistance of the District Office of Contract and Procurement, it will no longer need to rely upon the assistance of the GSA. 77. Most new cars are sent directly to the patrol fleet. Due to harsh driving conditions cars should be rotated out of patrol after two years and placed in a less rigorous assignment. 78. The MPD spends $.42/mile to maintain its fleet. The median for the police departments surveyed in the report was $.25/mile. See Fleet Cost Analysis, App. E, Doc.2. While some of ficials noted that the MPD's figure may include such costs as overhead and rent for the FMD facility, the figure remains high even after that adjustment. 79. The RFP has been issued and the MPD is awaiting final bids for the outsourcing of the maintenance function. The MPD also has budgeted the acquisition of 200 additional vehicles under the Master Lease program for the next fiscal year. The purchasing function, however, is not included in the current RFP. 80. Seized Cash Management Policy, App. E, Doc. 3. 81. The Special Committee notes that many statements of Booz-Allen and Hamilton critical of the performance and security at Property Division have been retracted. Booz-Allen's preliminary report issued on August 6, 1997, made a number of statements concerning security and management at the Property Division that were false or misleading. Booz-Allen later retracted most of those statements in its status report released on November 7, 1997. For example, the preliminary report stated that two cases had been dismissed in recent years due to lost evidence. This statement was false and later was retracted by Booz-Allen. There were at least eight other criticisms levied against the MPD's Property Division that later were retracted. See Summary of Booz-Allen Findings, App. E, Doc. 4. 82. Under the quartermaster system the MPD purchased uniforms and equipment based on anticipated need and accumulated inventory in a warehouse. It appears, however, that the MPD grossly overestimated its need for many items that now are unusable. indeed, the MPD still owns nearly $300.000 in unusable inventory. For example, MPD owns 998 size ten female pants, 90 size 54 belts, and 180 size 24 belts. 83. The Inspector General conducted a similar investigation of the 91 I system shortly after the Special Committee began it work. The findings detailed in the inspector General's report are consistent with the Special Committee's own findings. See Inspector General's Report, App. E, Doc. 5. 84. Communications Division 911 Report, App. E, Doc. 6. 85. Communications Division Chart, App. E, Doc. 7. 86. Indeed, it appears that telephone receipt clerks have a much larger number of stressful contacts with citizens than officers on the street. 87. MDCs are computer systems that are installed in the patrol cars. They provide officers with.instant access to information that in prior years they could receive only through dispatchers, such as license and registration checks and warrant information. Currently, the MDCs only allow officers to receive information regarding individuals, automobiles and other property. Eventually, as the MPD completes its information Technology Initiative, the computers will allow for electronic dispatch. 88. IT Initiative, App. E, Doc. 8. 89. General Order 1202.1. App. F. Doc. 1. 90. For a detailed analysis of the former CCRB's shortcomings, see the report prepared by the law firm of Piper & Marbury L.L.P. for the American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, Analvsis of the District of Columbia s Civilian Complaint Review Board and Recommendations for its Replacement (1995), App. F. Doc. 2. 91. Bill 12-521 (enrolled version), App. F. Doc. 3. 92. CAC Roster, App. F. Doc. 4. 93. On paper, the MPD has a volunteer program operated through a Volunteer Services Bureau; however. the program does not appear to exist in practice. 94. For an example of the newsletter, see App. F. Doc. 5. 95. For an organizational chart, see App. F. Doc. 6. 96. Extensive materials on the MCP volunteer program are included in App. F. Doc. 7. 97. Boston Police Department 1996 Annual Report, App. F. Doc. 8. 98. For example, PSA 108 has an Internet Website. See http://crime.washingtondc-online.com. 99. Keenan began his career as a member of the MPD before becoming a prosecutor and personally values and appreciates the change in culture wrought by community prosecution and policing in the District. 100. Materials on the Community Prosecution Project are included in App. F, Doc. 9 101. There are. however, some instances of poor investigatory procedures that lend credence to the claim that some officers are given special consideration. For example. in the Hill and Sanders case discussed in _ 4B1 the Special Committee learned that some witnesses with probative evidence against Walltower had not been interviewed by Internal Affairs.. 102. See generally Disciplinary Procedure Chart, App. G. Doc. 1. 103. Only officers and sergeants can be members of the Fraternal Order of Police. Sworn personnel holding the rank of lieutenant and above are not formally subject to the same rules, although for the most part the rules are followed in practice regardless of rank. 104. Notwithstanding the four levels of review, Asst. Chief Sonya T. Proctor, the former HRO, stated that one of her major concerns is the unacceptable number of incomplete investigations she receives from the field. She believes that unit commanders must do a better job of providing the HRO with thorough investigations. This is of particular concern because the 45-day rule sometimes prevents the HRO from sending the file back for further investigation. In those cases, the HRO must make a discipline recommendation based upon incomplete information. 105. The leading four types of misconduct that resulted in recommendations for adverse action in 1997 were court no-shows (572 cases), preventable accidents (140), false statements (78), and neglect of duty (64). See Misconduct for 1997, App. G. Doc. 2. 106. The MPD was unable to provide the Special Committee with information indicating the extent to which lateness or absence resulted in some adverse impact on the prosecution of a criminal case. The Special Committee suggests that the MPD endeavor to track such information. 107. See Special Order 96.6 (May 15, 1996), App. G. Doc. 3. 108. The Special Committee also notes that Chief Ramsey is considering ways to reduce the number of court related discipline cases. Ramsey stated that he had met with Chief Judge Hamilton of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to discuss the possibility of moving Court Liaison back into the courthouse to allow the office to maintain better contact with officers appearing in court. MPD also will explore certain scheduling changes — particularly with respect to traffic court and certain misdemeanors — to reduce the burden on officers and reduce the MPD's overtime expense. Adoption of an on-call system likely also would reduce court no shows. 109. Statement of Charles H. Ramsey (June 30, 1998), App. G. Doc. 4. 110. The new reporting and tracking procedures are identical to the procedure used by the Chicago Police Department. See App. G. Doc. 5. 111. Indeed, lack of information regarding the outcome of arbitrations may be a contributing factor to the MPD's poor arbitration record. 112. General Order 1202.1, Table of Penalties, App. G. Doc. 6. 113. Accrued benefits other than pension rights that are payable upon retirement or resignation may include lump sum distributions for unused leave or compensatory time. 114 The retirement of former Chief Larry Soulsby in November 1997 is an example. Soulsby retired under investigation for his potential involvement in the alleged misconduct of Lt. Jefferey Stowe, a friend and associate of Soulsby, including Stowe s renting of a luxury apartment under false pretenses (claiming it was to be used for a police undercover investigation). Soulsby shared the apartment with Stowe. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations and the pending investigation, Soulsby retired will a full annual pension of $74,800 per year. 115. Current D.C. law permits the District to deduct debts owed to the government from an employee's salary, except for retirement pay. D.C. Code §§1-630.3 to 1-630.4. The omnibus legislation permits exaction of a disciplinary fine as a "debt" upon retirement. 116. Such a status would not be unlike a dishonorable discharge from military service. 117. The previously discussed automated tracking system recently installed by Chief Ramsey should correct this deficiency. 118. Commander Coward now commands the Fifth District. During the Water & Sewer investigation, however, he was the Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility. |
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