Report of the Special Committee on Police Misconduct and Personnel Management of the Council of the District of Columbia
October 6, 1998

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D. Management of Personnel: Overtime and Off-duty

a. Overview

One of the Special Committee's areas of significant concern is the MPD's significant annual overtime expenditures and its overtime budgeting process. As of August 1, 1998. one and one-half months before the end of the fiscal year, the MPD had spent approximately $17.04 million on overtime.³⁸ This figure is in line with recent historical trends on overtime spending. From FY 1991-1997, the MPD has spent an annual average of approximately $16 million on overtime. The MPD's budgeted overtime expenditures over the past several years, however, have been considerably lower. Overtime budgets for FY 1997, 1996. and 1995, were approximately $11.7 million. $9.2 million, and $5.4 million, respectively. Actual gross overtime expenditures for these years were $23.9 million (FY 97), $12.1 million (FY 96), and $10.8 million (FY 95).³⁹ Accordingly, the MPD consistently was over budget on overtime by several million dollars for each of those fiscal years. To fund the resulting overtime deficit, the MPD relies on "lapsed salaries," which is the annual budget surplus that results when the MPD fails to hire up to its fully authorized police force which in 1998 was 3800 members. The Special Committee is concerned that MPD's reliance on "lapsed salaries" provides disincentives for the MPD to hire its fully authorized allotment of officers.. This practice also results in poor fiscal management. Rather than rely on "lapsed salaries." the MPD should strive to reduce its overtime expenditures and budget honestly by bringing its annual overtime budgets in line with historical data on actual expenditures.

The MPD has implemented several initiatives to curb overtime spending to the extent feasible. There are two broad forms of police overtime: court overtime and non-court. or "programmatic," overtime. The MPD incurs court overtime expenditures when officers are summoned to appear in court by the USAO outside of their regular duty hours. Programmatic overtime results from all other police-related work that an officer performs outside of a regular duty assignment with the exception of off-duty employment. The Special Committee's investigation revealed instances in which both court and programmatic overtime may have been subject to abuse and mismanagement as described fully below. Working in cooperation with the USAO, however. the MPD has taken steps to curtail unnecessary court and programmatic overtime expenditures. The efficacy of these measures must continue to be closely monitored by the MPD and the Council.

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b. Court Overtime

MPD incurs a significant portion of the MPD's overtime expenditures through officers court appearances. In four of the past six years. court overtime represented more than 45% of the MPD's total overtime expenditures.⁴⁰ In dollar terms, in FY 1997, court overtime cost the MPD $6.9 million. These substantial outlays are. however, largely beyond the control of MPD management. The USAO controls whether and when an officer appears for court. and, to some extent. the duration of the appearance. This situation has given rise to some frustration among MPD fiscal managers struggling to curb overtime expenditures, and some friction between prosecutors and police management.

It is clear that police officers must appear in court. Arrests cannot be processed, case investigated, or prosecutions brought without police testimony. Court appearances are therefore a regular police function, and it is expected that effective police officers will appear frequently in court. In order not to disrupt police scheduling, and to prevent short-staffing, it is also expected that officers oftentimes will not be able to appear during their regular tour of duty. Indeed, officers working the so-called "midnight" shift (11 p.m.-7 am.), by necessity, will appear in court only when off-duty. Officers who appear in court off-duty are paid at an overtime rate. The challenge for MPD management and the U.S. Attorney is to ensure that officers appear in court only the minimum number of hours necessary to prosecute cases effectively. Otherwise, unduly long or frequent court appearances result in unwarranted overtime expenditures.

There has been a longstanding concern among MPD management that court overtime has been abused. To understand the potential for abuse, a brief explanation of the MPD's court appearance process is necessary. Officers appear in court through a CANS (Computer Automated Notification System) notice, which is issued by a prosecutor. The CANS notice is processed through the MPD's Office of Court Liaison, which arranges for the officer to be served with a notice in his or her unit. CANS notices are issued not only for actual court appearances (e.g., trial, hearings) but for any officer appearance at the USAO. For example, if a prosecutor must meet with an officer for trial preparation. a CANS notice for a "witness conference" will be issued. Similarly, officers may be summoned to the grand jury via a CANS notice while a case is under investigation.

When an officer appears pursuant to the CANS notice, he/she must "check in" with the Office of Court Liaison. The officer is given a form (PD 140) on which is noted the case(s) for which the officer checked in, the nature of the appearance, the time spent, and the prosecutor for whose case the officer has checked in.⁴¹ The officer must have that prosecutor sign the PD 140 to account for time spent "checked in" to court. At the end of the court appearance, the officer must "check out" with Court Liaison with a completed PD 140. That form, the prosecutor s initials. is the authorization for the officer to be paid overtime.

Former directors and officials at Court Liaison supplied the Special Committee staff with evidence of problems with this system. Officers would "check in" to court for a witness conference with a prosecutor often to find the prosecutor unavailable to meet when scheduled. Several officers recounted instances of  being forced to wait hours until the prosecutor was available. or of meetings that were not canceled until after the officer arrived. Of course, the officer is paid overtime while waiting for the prosecutor, and the scheduling difficulties result in unnecessary overtime expenditures.

Of greater concern was the practice of issuing so-called "blanket CANS" notices. Over time. prosecutors became frustrated with their inability to ensure that officers would appear for court when needed and that basic investigative work was not being performed on cases. As a result. CANS notices were issued for a greater number of officers than actually were needed in order to ensure that some minimum of officers actually appeared. Some prosecutors reportedly fell into a practice of regularly issuing CANS notices for entire squads of officers regardless of their actual role in the case. The PD 168, a form prepared during "papering" (i.e., initial processing) of a case, lists the names of officers involved and therefore authorized to be issued CANS notices for subsequent court appearances.⁴² "Blanket CANS" notices were issued, which simply named all of the officers listed on the PD 168, even if fewer officers actually were needed for a particular appearance.

This practice provided opportunities for overtime abuse and manipulation of the system. A former supervisory sergeant at Court Liaison informed the Special Committee staff about the following regular practice among certain detective squads, particularly Homicide and certain Vice units. Officers without any substantial role in an investigation would nonetheless arrange to be listed on the PD 168 so that they would be included on the subsequent CANS notices. One example of such abuse would be the effort to involve as many officers in the "chain of custody" for evidence as possible in order to expand the number of officers on the CANS list. Reportedly, entire squads would be included on the CANS notice for relatively simple investigations. Fearful of jeopardizing their investigations or being unable to prosecute cases effectively, prosecutors either were unable or unwilling to curtail this practice. As a result, a greater number of officers earned court overtime than was necessary.

Furthermore, officers were issued court appearance CANS notices to perform routine investigative work. Police "on duty" investigative work on a case generally ended with the arrest of a suspect. More often than not, however, a case requires additional investigative work before trial. Prosecutors issued court appearance CANS notices to officers so that the officers could complete the investigation. Officers would perform investigative tasks while checked into court, receiving overtime, although the officers were not actually at court or the USAO. Some detectives eagerly sought such opportunities because of the lucrative overtime. These detectives. many of whom were exceptional investigators, would volunteer their services to prosecutors with whom they had worked on prior cases. In prosecutors would issue CANS notices to these detectives to perform investigative work, even on cases to which the detectives were not assigned. These "freelance" investigators would be issued multiple CANS on multiple cases and therefore received a disproportionate share of court overtime. In MPD records subpoenaed by the Special Committee. the same officers routinely appear on the list of the Department s top overtime earners. oftentimes doubling or tripling their regular salary. The Special Committee questions the appropriateness of having officers conducting investigative work while checked into court, particularly on cases originating from other units. The availability and need for the service of these "freelance" detectives also implies deficiencies in the investigative work of other detectives or investigators in the department.

Both the USAO and the MPD's Office of Court Liaison have long been aware of these concerns and recently have been working together to address these issues. On December 13, 1996, the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") on the Principles and Rules of the Officer Court Appearance System.⁴³ The MOU outlines the procedures for prosecutors to issue appearance CANS notices intended both to streamline the process and curtail the aforementioned practices. Prosecutors are only to sign PD 140s for officers who actually appear in court and are to schedule meetings and appearances. in so far as possible, during an officer's regular tour of duty. The MOU also established an Administrative/investigative CANS notice through which officers would be required to perform routine investigative work, for the USAO, during their regular tour of duty.⁴⁴ Because of administrative difficulties, many of the MOU's provisions were implemented only in the spring and summer of 1998. Since that time, the USAO and the MPD began a pilot project for the Administrative/Investigative CANS notice with the Sex Crimes and Mobile Crimes squads. The MPD hopes eventually to expand use of the Administrative/investigative CANS notice to the department as a whole in the near future. Testifying before the Special Committee, United States Attorney Wilma Lewis expressed her support for the CANS MOU procedures and stated that her office will move to implement them as expeditiously as possible.

The MPD also has taken steps on its own to address court overtime issues. Most notably. the MPD designed and implemented a computerized personnel tracking system called TACIS ("Time, Attendance, and Court information System"). Since June 1995, the CANS and court check in process has been fully automated through TACIS. That system permits MPD supervisors to monitor closely individual officers' overtime expenditures and court activity. As of April 15, 1998, all MPD members' time and attendance have been fully tracked through TACIS. The system was demonstrated to Special Committee staff, and, if fully utilized, TACIS would prove an invaluable management tool and would give MPD management. rather than the USAO, greater control over overtime work.⁴⁵

Through TACIS and Court Liaison. the MPD also has redesigned the PD 140 and PD 168 forms. When checked into court, officers are now required to account for their time in half-hour increments. each of which must be initialed by a prosecutor. When a case is initially processed. an MPD supervisor must complete the redesigned PD 168, which authorizes the issuance of subsequent CANS to a maximum of only nine officers on that case. The supervisor must certify that the "members on this form actively participated in the investigation of this offense and/or arrest of the defendant(s) and are actively involved police witness(es)." Additional officers may be added to the PD 168 only through completion of a second form (PD 168-A)⁴⁶ with the approval and signature of a prosecutor. These new procedures are designed to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the practice of issuing unnecessary "blanket CANS" notices for court.

To address the problem of officers' failure to appear in court, the MPD has implemented a strict disciplinary policy that results in automatic imposition of an adverse action (i.e., suspension, fine, or termination) for a second unexcused absence or tardiness in a twelve-month period. See Subsection G. infra (discussion of discipline).

Court attendance statistics for 1997 demonstrate that the majority of police court appearances (44.7%) were for trials. Papering (initial processing of arrests) resulted in the next highest percentage at 18.9%. The two areas suspected of resulting in court overtime abuse, witness conferences and grand jury appearances. represented 12.4% and 11.5% of appearances, respectively. These data suggest that the bulk of court overtime expenditures is affected by court scheduling rather than by the MPD or the USAO. Unfortunately, it also appears that much of court overtime for trials is wasted. Although approximately 300 Superior Court cases are set for trial each month, only approximately 30 cases actually are tried. Most officers arrive at court only to have the case continued for a later date. Even for those cases that go to trial when scheduled, officers must remain at court without doing anything productive. As Chief Judge Eugene Hamilton of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia testified before the Special Committee, the effective functioning of the criminal justice system may require this allocation of police resources. Nevertheless. and as discussed in further detail below in the Special Committee's recommendations, Chief Judge Hamilton, the U.S. Attorney, and the Chief of Police may be willing to experiment with a limited "on call" system on a trial basis that would obviate the need for officers to spend countless hours awaiting testimony in court.

The Special Committee recommends that the MPD, the USAO, and the Superior Court implement an on-call system for officers' court appearances on a trial basis. Because most officers carry pagers or cellular phones, prosecutors can contact the officers without difficulty. It be possible to fashion a system that enables officers to be available, on short notice. for court appearances while conducting regular police business in the meantime.

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c. Programmatic Overtime

As the following numbers indicate. unnecessary court overtime expenditures. however. are only half the problem. In FY 1997, FY 1996, and FY 1995, the MPD spent $16.9 million. $7.6 million. and $3.6 million, respectively on non-court overtime. In FY 1997, programmatic overtime spending alone exceeded the MPD's total overtime budget by more than $5 million. While some of the programmatic overtime spending is reimbursed through federal and other grants, the bull; of the expenditures come from the MPD's own coffers. Substantial spending on programmatic overtime is not. by itself. suspect. Special crime fighting initiatives may warrant increased spending for overtime pay. Nevertheless, the Special Committee is concerned that. at least historically, the results achieved through programmatic overtime expenditures are not justified.

One case study examined in detail by the Special Committee involved programmatic overtime use by the MPD's Homicide Branch. Captain William Corboy, a former Homicide official, provided the Special Committee with a copy of a report that he prepared indicating that certain Homicide squads' high use of overtime did not result in a correspondingly high case closure rate.⁴⁷ In an effort to improve the Homicide closure rate in July 1996, then-Chief Larry Soulsby authorized unlimited overtime for Homicide detectives. Towards the end of 1996, Corboy reported to Homicide supervisors his belief that certain detectives were abusing the policy. He believed that certain squads were collecting a significant amount of overtime that was not justified by their relatively low case closure rates and workloads. The report also found that the Safe Streets and Cold Case squads both were among the biggest consumers of overtime (17.94% and 12.13%. respectively). but the Platoon in which both squads were assigned had the lowest case load. Corboy suggested that this Platoon in general, and the Cold Case and Safe Streets squads in particular, consumed a disproportionate amount of the Homicide Branch's total overtime in relation to the Platoon's small number of cases and contribution to the overall case closure rate. Although not mentioned in the report. it is plausible that the Cold Case squad — the purpose of which is to investigate complex, older homicides which may not have current leads — would legitimately consume a disproportionate amount of overtime because of the nature of its case load.

In any event, the report suggested the need for further study to determine if increased overtime use had any positive effect on case closures. This study was never done, and Corboy eventually was transferred from Homicide. Interviews with several Homicide officials indicated that Chief Soulsby was aware of the situation in the spring of 1997. but he did not act on the information before his resignation in November 1997.

This report was significant in three respects. First. it strongly suggests that there is not a direct correlation between high levels of overtime and improvement in performance statistics. It would counter the argument that the best way to fight crime is to increase police overtime. Second. the report demonstrates a need for a more extensive follow-up inquiry expanding upon these issues. MPD should review in detail questions regarding the effective use of overtime and its abuse. For example, apart from the statistical information contained in his April 1997 report, Corboy discussed his impression with Committee staff that individuals within the Homicide Branch abused overtime by performing little or no effective work while "on the book" and instead conducted core investigative work while being paid overtime. Third, the report suggests the need for more controlled monitoring of overtime use and effectiveness. Some controls are being implemented through the CANS MOU and the TACIS system, as discussed above, and the utility of those controls should be monitored. A more detailed study may also identify further controls that should be implemented.

To that end, as MPD Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") Eric Coard testified before the Special Committee, the MPD has instituted a new approval process for programmatic overtime. Implemented January 1998, MPD policy requires that the CFO and Chief of Police review and preapprove all overtime. Previously. there had been a practice of field officials authorizing, and officers working, overtime without preapproval. As a result, there was little monitoring of overtime consumption. Under the new policy, each MPD command (e.g., district. headquarters unit) is given an annual overtime budget.⁴⁸ When a commander requests overtime, he or she must submit a form to the CFO's office that specifies the extent and duration of the overtime detail, the expected costs and the results hoped to be achieved.⁴⁹ The CFO then determines whether the overtime request is within the originating command's budget and forwards it to the Chief of Police for approval. The Chief then determines whether the overtime detail's expected results justify the expenditure. If a command already has expended its overtime budget, the Chief may nonetheless approve the detail depending on need. Upon the Chief s approval, the TACIS group creates a special computer code for the overtime detail. The computer code is of limited duration and expires at the end of the detail. This control is important, as officers cannot be paid without the TACIS code. It is expected that this overtime pre-approval process will substantially reduce MPD overtime expenditures. Initial data seems promising: in the second quarter of FY 98. overtime expenditures were $1.6 million as compared to $8.6 million in the second quarter of FY 97.

Continued progress should be closely monitored through the Council Judiciary s regular oversight over the MPD. Given the past concerns raised above. the MPD should also conduct an audit of overtime use. The results of this audit should be presented to the Council s oversight committees in addition to a progress report on the MPD's overtime control efforts no later than one year after the publication of this Report.⁵⁰

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d. "Lapsed Salaries"

MPD consistently exceeds its annual overtime budget. indeed, the MPD exceeded its overtime budget from FY 1993-1997 by several million dollars per year. The current fiscal year is not likely to be an exception. Dr. Abdusalem Omer, the District of Columbia's Deputy Chief Financial Officer, Office of Budget of Planning, testified before the Special Committee that, as of March 31, 1998, MPD was expected to exceed its overtime budget by 100% ($9.2 million budget with forecasted expenditures of $19 million). Actual data supplied from the MPD's TACIS group indicate that, as of August 1, 1998, MPD overtime expenditures were approximately $17.04 million. The data signify that, each year, the MPD faces a significant overtime budget deficit that must be otherwise funded.

This overtime budget deficit is funded through a budget pool which is colloquially known as "lapsed salaries." This budget pool is created when the MPD fails to hire up to its fully authorized complement of sworn officers (3800 in 1998). The MPD's current force is 3,555 sworn members. The difference between the authorized complement of 3,800 officers and the 3.555 actual force results in a budgeted salary surplus of approximately $10 million. Over the last several years, this `'lapsed salary" surplus has been used to fund the overtime budget deficit. Omer and Coard both testified that the MPD apparently has come to rely on this "lapsed salary" pool. Omer indicated that the MPD could face a dire financial crisis if it were ever to hire its fully authorized 3800 member force. thus expending the "lapsed salary" pool.⁵¹

Dr. Omer raised several potential causes for the consistently over-budget overtime expenditures in his testimony. As stated earlier, court overtime is difficult to control, and sworn officers have come to view overtime, both court and programmatic, as an entitlement. In Omer's view, overtime institutionalized. rather than an occasional exception to regular practice. Omer testified, "[u]ltimately overtime is a management issue. Leadership must come from the Chief and the District commanders if the Department is to control overtime."⁵² The Special Committee wholeheartedly endorses Dr. Omer's position.

Several Special Committee members expressed concern that reliance on "lapsed salaries' provides disincentives for the MPD to hire its full complement of officers.. In effect. the "lapsed salary" pool is regularly used to disguise the fact that the MPD regularly has exceeded its overtime budget. The Special Committee is not suggesting that the MPD's overtime expenditures necessarily should be cut, although management should closely scrutinize such overtime. Reliance on a "lapsed salary" pool, however, is basically an accounting gimmick and detrimental to responsible financial planning and budgetary honesty in the District government.

MPD's overtime budget should reflect historical usage data, with an adjustment to account for the efficiency of new overtime controls. The ultimate goal is to have an accurate overtime consumption assessment for budgeting purposes. In the context of this analysis, the MPD should consider whether its authorized staffing level should be adjusted. indeed, the FY 1999 budget reduces the authorized number of sworn officers to 3600, and allocates the savings elsewhere. This signals a move away from reliance on "lapsed salaries." Further monitoring will be necessary to ensure the MPD does not revert to prior practice.

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e. Recommendations

The Special Committee recommends that:

(1) Within one year after publication of this Report, the MPD present to the Council an audit and progress report on overtime use and control measures.

(2) MPD and the District's CFO strive for truthful budgeting for overtime expenses, and discontinue reliance on "lapsed salaries."

(3) MPD, the USAO, and the Superior Court adopt a pilot "on-call" system for officers' court appearances.

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2. Off-Duty Employment

a. Overview

In 1982, the Council authorized MPD officers to engage in off-duty employment subject to regulations established by the Chief of Police. Since that time, a significant portion of MPD members have engaged in some form of police-related off-duty employment for a variety of employers (e.g., banks, retail establishments. restaurants. bars, night clubs).⁵³ The MPD s Office of Labor Relations reports that about 820 MPD members (23% of the force) are currently authorized to work off-duty employment. The Special Committee is concerned that officers working off-duty make their off-duty assignments their primary focus.

The Special Committee examined several areas of concern. The Special Committee uncovered an "underground" economy of MPD members brokering other officers off-duty employment in apparent violation of General Order 201.17, which prohibits officers from acting as third-party employers or referral agents.⁵⁴ The Special Committee considered whether the MPD should sharply limit. or eliminate, off-duty employment at establishments regulated by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs ("ABC establishments',) including bars and nightclubs. As a case study, the Special Committee examined off-duty employment at the Ibex Club - the site of the tragic shooting death of Officer Brian Gibson who was murdered in February 1997 by a patron who had been ejected from the club by an off-duty officer working at the Ibex. The Special Committee also considered whether the current off-duty employment hour limit of thirty hours per week was too high and resulted in officer. exhaustion and inefficiency. Various means of managing and reforming the off-duty employment system also were examined. including the expert testimony of a manager of the Boston Police Department. which uses a centralized off-duty system.

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b. Off-duty Employment Policy

General Order 201.17 sets forth MPD's policy on off-duty employment. Generally, officers may engage in off-duty employment. subject to departmental approval, except in the following areas:

• employment in any business over which the MPD exercises a special supervisory or regulatory function,
• employment as a private investigator or to enforce "house rules" at an ABC establishment,
• employment that would constitute a conflict of interest,
• employment that requires access to confidential police records.
• employment in a capacity that directly or indirectly interferes with proper arid efficient performance of police duties,
• employment by another agency of the District government (except where specifically approved), and
• employment by a U.S. or foreign governmental agency.

The General Order also states that "[m]embers shall not in their official capacity solicit or act as referral agents between other members seeking police-related outside employment and potential employers. No member shall be approved as a third-party employer." Similarly, the General Order prohibits members from "providing private guards (officers) or special police officers to commercial establishments or other individuals" and "providing off-duty services of other members of the department for police-related activities to such individuals or commercial establishments."⁵⁵

In order to obtain approval for off-duty work, an officer. must first submit completed forms PD 180 and PD 180-B to his direct supervisor.⁵⁶ A completed PD 180 indicates the name and address of the prospective employer, the type of business, a detailed description of the duties to be performed, and the number of hours per week to be worked. The PD 180-B is an employer agreement which states the conditions for off-duty employment. For police-related employment, the employer must procure a certificate evidencing at least $100,000 in liability insurance, and the employer must pay a $20 quarterly uniform fee. After the officer. submits this paperwork, the officer's direct supervisor approves the off-duty employment and forwards the forms to the Labor Relations Office for final approval. For members of the rank of Lieutenant and above, the Chief of Police approves the request. After the officer's off-duty work is approved, he must submit quarterly reports (form PD 1 80-A) listing the hours worked.⁵⁷ If he fails to submit the quarterly reports, the Department may revoke his off-duty work authorization. Officers currently may work up to 30 hours per week off duty.

Once the MPD approves the off-duty employment. it takes no further active role in regulating or monitoring the officer's conduct, other than the collection of PD 180-A forms each quarter. The MPD's Office of Labor Relations maintains files containing the PD 180. 1 80-A. and 1 80-B forms for officers both currently approved to work off-duty and for officers whose off-duty approval was canceled or revoked. Members are required to inform Labor Relations if they have stopped working off-duty. Labor Relations maintains a computer database that lists the names and employers of members currently approved to work off-duty. Apart from this paperwork, the MPD does not appear to monitor compliance with General Order 201.17.

Records subpoenaed from Labor Relations appeared to be either incomplete or inaccurate. The Special Committee subpoenaed records from a cross-section of off-duty employers. Over 50 officers working off-duty did not appear on Labor Relations' list. The Special Counsel referred this information to the Office of Professional Responsibility. OPR's investigation concluded that the majority of the officers were, in fact, approved to work off-duty, and that Labor Relations data were erroneous. Moreover, while records as to current off-duty employment in the paper files appear reasonably complete, files as to past off-duty employment are spotty and occasionally purged. The Special Committee believes that tracking off-duty employment through TACIS, as recommended below, may help solve these recordkeeping problems.

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c. Off-duty Employment Practice -- "Brokering"

Notwithstanding the clear prohibition in General Order 201.17 against officers acting as "referral agents" or third-party employers for off-duty employment, several members act as off-duty employment "brokers" for other officers. These "brokers" schedule other officers to work off-duty. assist officers in preparing their MPD approval paperwork, act as liaison between the off-duty employer and the other-off- duty officers. and select the officers who work off-duty. In some instances, the "broker" actually works off- duty along with the other officers.. In other cases, the "broker" is compensated solely for his or her scheduling and other services. The Special Committee also encountered circumstances in which the off- duty employer compensated the "broker" directly, usually at some fixed rate, and one case in which the officers paid the "broker" a "scheduling fee." interviews with MPD members and documents subpoenaed from off-duty employers suggest that the practice of using "brokers" is relatively widespread. Indeed, there appears to be an underground economy of MPD members providing scheduling, referral, and hiring services for off-duty employers District-wide, although the full extent of this practice is difficult to detect.

As a case study, the Special Committee investigated the "brokering" activities of a former MPD District Commander, Joseph Adamany. Adamany provided "brokering" services for at least two employers, Winn Management and Hines Interests, both of which are management companies for commercial and residential rental properties in the District. Documents subpoenaed from these employers, and the MPD, and interviews of officers "brokered" by Adamany paint the following picture of his activities. Adamany provided a full range of services for both employers. He selected and scheduled officers to work, filled scheduling gaps if there were cancellations, assisted officers in preparing MPD paperwork, acted as liaison between property managers and police, and occasionally "dropped by" the properties to check in on the officers work. Officers that employers did not interview them; rather, Adamany was responsible for their selection.⁵⁸ Adamany provided "brokering" services for Winn Management from approximately September 1993 when he was a Captain in the Seventh District until March 1997 when he became the Director of Court Liaison. At that time, according to Adamany, he canceled his off-duty employment for Winn Management out of concern for a conflict of interest because security work at Winn s apartment complexes was "arrest intensive." Adamany continued brokering for Hines until he was promoted to Commander of the Third District in February 1998. at which time he voluntarily canceled his off-duty work.

In interviews before the Special Committee staff and in testimony before the Special Committee, Adamany denied that his scheduling services violated General Order 201.17. He steadfastly maintained that the text of the General Order nowhere prohibits scheduling, and he claimed that his services were limited to that role. He denied having acted as a third-party employer or as a referral agent, notwithstanding the testimony and interview statements of several officers that he selected them for employment and generally supervised their conduct.

Adamany's statement that he believes that his off-duty work was proper was belied by what the Special Committee found to be significant efforts to conceal the nature of his off-duty work from the MPD. Adamany provided his services to Winn Management through a business. Management Services, that he allegedly owned and operated with his wife. There is no indication on Adamany's approval paperwork that he was providing scheduling services for off-duty officers. On the PD 180 approval form that Adamany submitted on November 21, 1993, Adamany described his off-duty work for Management Services to ' provide consulting services, managerial audits, and service inquiry audits for retail and or property managers."⁵⁹ Adamany's PD 1 80-B states that his work is non-police related. Neither document references his scheduling services. More troubling is the manner in which Adamany was compensated. Rather than paid directly for his scheduling services, Commander Adamany apparently was paid through his wife, who was on the Winn Management payroll. Several officers who worked at Winn stated that Adamany's wife did not provide any scheduling services nor did she assist Joseph Adamany in his duties. One officer stated that Mrs. Adamany was paid instead of Joseph Adamany to conceal his direct involvement at Winn from MPD management because of the conflict of interest inherent in his "brokering" officers at apartment complexes in his district. At that time, Adamany was a Captain in the Seventh District where some Winn-managed apartments were located. Commander Adamany maintained that his wife sporadically assisted in providing "scheduling" services but acknowledged that he was the primary scheduler." He claimed that she was on the Winn Management payroll rather than himself because of unspecified tax reasons that were not fully explained to the Special Committee. At Hines. Adamany was paid directly a set fee per week.

Notwithstanding Adamany's denials of impropriety, the Special Committee concluded that Adamany acted at least as a "referral agent " if not a "third-party employer." violation of General Order 201.17. In addition to Adamany's admitted scheduling services. several police witnesses informed the Special Committee that Adamany provided a range of other services. including preparing MPD paperwork, acting as a liaison to management. and. most significantly. selecting the officers to work at Winn and Hines. Although the off-duty employers paid the officers directly. Adamany had control over which officers worked and their schedules. He was essentially running a private security service. Commander Adamany resigned from the MPD after being given the option of demotion in June 1998, two months after his testimony before the Special Committee.

Adamany's conduct is a single example of the type of "brokering" services that were provided by MPD members. Detective Kenny Rodgers, who also testified before the Special Committee, provided scheduling services for a series of Wendy's Restaurant franchises in Washington owned and operated by DavCo, Inc. Rodgers provided many of the same services as Adamany, including selecting officers to work, scheduling officers, helping officers prepare paperwork, and acting as a liaison with the employer generally. Unlike Adamany, Rodgers received no compensation from the employer for his services. Rather, Rodgers charged his fellow officers a "scheduling fee" of $60 per month. Although Rodgers claimed that officers were not required to pay this fee to work, the Special Committee was unable to find an example of an officer. currently working who had not paid the fee. In addition. no officer arranged employment with Wendy's on his or her own. If an officer wanted to work off-duty at those restaurants, apparently he or she would have to go through Rodgers. In his testimony before the Special Committee Rodgers stated he does not believe that his activities violated General Order 201.17, which he believes is vague on the question of whether scheduling other officers is permitted.

The above-referenced circumstances are not unique. The Special Committee encountered anecdotal evidence, and interviewed additional witnesses, regarding other "brokers" operating throughout the District of Columbia. Although further investigation would be necessary to confirm the impression, it appears that many of the off-duty employment opportunities in the District of Columbia are controlled by one or more police "brokers." The Special Committee believes that General Order 201.17, as presently written, prohibits this conduct.

Nevertheless, since witnesses claimed the General Order was ambiguous regarding "brokering," General Order 201.17 must be clarified strictly to prohibit such activity. The corresponding Montgomery County policy prohibits an officer. from acting as "an intermediary between a particular employer and a group of employees employed as watchmen/security guards for the purpose of scheduling, coordinating or any other similar activity."⁶⁰ The omnibus legislation adds similar language added to General Order 201. 17.

Because of the inherent potential for conflict of interest presented by off-duty employment. the Special Committee believes that the MPD should take further steps to regulate off-duty work Other jurisdictions are models for managing off-duty employment in which they exercise a far greater degree of control. For example, William Good, the Chief of the Administrative Services Bureau of the Boston Police Department. testified before the Special Committee on Boston s centralized maid detail" system. There, off- duty employers contract directly with the police for security services. In turn, full time "paid detail" clerks at each police district schedule officers to work. and the "paid detail" is treated like any other duty assignment. Rather than paid directly by the private employer, officers are paid by the Department. A similar system is in place in Metro Dade County, Florida. The model off-duty employment policy of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) proposes adoption of such a centralized system.⁶¹ Such a system eliminates the potential for conflict of interest and dual loyalty to employers, and standardizes the terms of off-duty employment generally. As MPD Chief Ramsey testified before the Special Committee, however, this system is not without pitfalls. It would require an additional MPD bureaucracy to operate. Moreover, the Boston system has been criticized as a "public works program" for police officers due to local law that requires police officers to be employed at any construction site.⁶²

Fairfax County uses a hybrid of Boston's "department-contract" system and the MPD's "officer- contract" system.⁶³ There, an officer signs up at his district for off-duty employment. Personnel at the district schedule the off-duty work. which is treated as a regular duty assignment. although the employer pays the officer directly. The minimum salary for off-duty employment also is fixed by the Department.⁶⁴ This system also eliminates brokering and conflict of interest concerns and therefore has many of the same strengths of the department-contract system without the same level of bureaucracy. In fact, this system currently appears to operate in the MPD via sign-up for off-duty details at the MCI Arena, which are open to members assigned to the Special Operations Division and the First District.

The Special Committee recommends that the MPD leadership consider adopting a model along the lines of either Boston or Fairfax that provides for increased control over off-duty employment and eliminates or greatly reduces the potential for conflict of interest.

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d. Off-duty Employment Practice — ABC Establishments

Another issue of concern is the employment of off-duty police officers in ABC establishments. Off- duty employment at ABC establishments makes up a relatively small proportion of off-duty employment in the District generally. Nevertheless, officers currently are employed in a variety of ABC establishments ranging from hotels? restaurants, bars, nightclubs. and adult entertainment establishments. Documents subpoenaed from the MPD indicate that. as of March 1998. a total of 184 officers were employed in 43 such establishments. The majority of such officers (1 15) were employed in nightclubs and bars, where presumably the primary source of revenue is the sale of alcoholic beverages.⁶⁵

The Special Committee is concerned about the safety issues, inherent potential for conflict of interest, and the appearance of impropriety resulting from police off-duty employment in ABC establishments. One tragic case study illustrates this concern. At the Ibex nightclub in February 1997, Officer Brian Gibson was murdered while sitting in his police cruiser by a club patron who had just been ejected by a police officer who was working there off-duty. There is no suggestion that off-duty officers working at Ibex were in any manner responsible for Officer Gibson's death. There is a concern. however, that off-duty officers were employed as security at a club that appears to have been a flashpoint for crime in the community in which it was located. Months prior to the shooting. the club's landlord had been attempting to address the security and crime problems there. Working with the Fourth District community relations officer, the landlord compiled crime statistics indicating that on the Ibex's so-called "go-go" nights, crime rates in the neighborhood skyrocketed. Conversely, on the nights when the club was closed, the neighborhood remained comparatively quiet. Despite repeated meetings between the club managers and police officials, including the district commander, action was not taken to address security at the club until after Officer Gibson's shooting. After his death, the club immediately was closed.

For some time prior to the shooting, officers worked off-duty at the Ibex. Judith Anderson, the former community relations officer for the Fourth District and an ANC Commissioner and community group leader, believed that officers were brought in to improve the security situation at the club. In her view, however, the officers did not, and could not, have had much effect. On "go-go" nights. the club was full of patrons, and a few police officers could not make a tangible impact in policing literally hundreds of club-goers. Of greater concern is the appearance of impropriety that results from having officers employed at such an establishment. As Anderson testified before the Special Committee, putting young officers in clubs is a recipe for trouble. Early in their careers, these officers lack significant professional experience and judgment. They are placed in a position rife with the potential for conflict of interest as they owe dual loyalties to the police and to their off-duty employer. For example, an officer. to enforce liquor regulations even while working off duty but may hesitate to impose penalties on his or her off-duty employer for underage drinking violations. These officers, many of whom Anderson believes may be living beyond their means. are dependent upon off-duty employment as a salary supplement. The Special Committee shares her concern that having officers working in such ABC establishments is fraught with risk, both in terms of the health and safety of the officers and because of the potential for conflict of interest and corruption.

The Special Committee proposes that the Council immediately adopt legislation prohibiting off- duty employment in ABC-licensed establishments. Chief Ramsey's immediate predecessor. interim-Chief Sonya Proctor, previously issued a directive prohibiting approval of any new employment in ABC establishments while grandfathering existing arrangements. The Special Committee recommends that this prohibition should be extended retroactively to eliminate all employment at ABC establishments. It should also be noted that neither Fairfax County nor the IACP model policy permit off-duty employment in most types of ABC establishments.

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e. Off-duty Employment Practice — Hours and Unauthorized Moonlighting

The Special Committee considered whether the hour limit on off-duty employment is too high. From the inception of the off-duty program in 1982 until 1996, the off-duty hour ceiling was 24 hours per week. In 1996, the Council passed legislation raising the ceiling to 30 hours per week. A review of surrounding jurisdictions' hour limits and interviews of police commanders suggest however. that 30 hours per week is excessive. One of the primary concerns with off-duty employment is whether it interferes with officers' primary police duties. Certainly, if officers are exhausted from "moonlighting," they cannot function effectively on the job. First District Commander William McManus testified before the Special Committee about his concern that officers were working too many off-duty hours. These officers appeared for work fatigued and their police work correspondingly suffered.

For the health and safety of the officers, and to improve police effectiveness, the Special Committee believes that the Council should revisit this 30 hour limit. For example, in Montgomery County, Maryland, off-duty employment in uniform is limited to a maximum of 16 hours in a 40 hour work week, days off excluded.66 In Fairfax County, Virginia, an officer. is not permitted to work more than 16 hours per day, including regular duty hours, off-duty work. and scheduled overtime (including court). Moreover, the total number of regular duty hours and off-duty in any pay period (two weeks) cannot exceed 120 hours, and there must be at least 8 continuous hours of no employment (including no off-duty work) between shifts.⁶⁷ These hour limits appear better to balance an officer's police obligations with off-duty employment than the current MPD hour limit. Indeed. the Special Committee is not aware of any limit on overtime employment in the District. Conceivably. therefore, an officer. could work 40 hours regular duty. 30 hours of off-duty work and additional hours of overtime each week. Although officers are unlikely to work such long hours. MPD regulations should limit even the potential for officer exhaustion.

Rather than prescribe separate hour maximums for regular duty and off-duty employment. the Special Committee believes that the Council should follow Fairfax s example by setting a comprehensive hour policy that accounts for all types of police-related employment (regular duty, Off-duty work, and overtime). The Special Committee does not propose an hour limit at this time. but recommends that the Council adopt a limitation in consultation with Chief Ramsey and MPD leadership. The Special Committee also suggests that the TACIS system, through which all officers are currently paid regular salary and overtime, be programmed to capture off-duty work. If the MPD were to take over the scheduling function, as is done in Fairfax, then the TACIS system appears to provide the perfect mechanism for scheduling and regulating off-duty work. Through that system, the MPD could monitor where officers are working and their hours. Failure to report hours or to adhere to limits should result in strict discipline.

The Special Committee also received information that salaries for off-duty employment vary considerably. leading to competition among officers for the higher paying jobs and exacerbating brokering problems. The Special Committee believes that wages for off-duty employment should be standardized.

The Special Committee also is concerned that a significant number of officers may be working off- duty employment without authorization. Documents subpoenaed from a small crosssection of off-duty employers and the MPD's Office of Labor Relations yielded the names of more than 50 officers who worked off-duty but did not appear on the MPD "approved" list. This data suggest that either the MPD off-duty database is inaccurate or incomplete or that many officers are working off-duty without departmental approval. The Special Committee referred this matter to the MPD Office of Internal Affairs for further investigation.

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f. Recommendations

(2) Requires MPD to consider a more centralized and regulated off-duty employment system modeled along systems in place in Boston or the Fairfax Police Departments.

(1) Review its policy concerning payment of police overtime salaries for providing security at private events, such as the MCI Arena, the movie detail and community events and establish and publish an equitable and consistent policy to address such situations.

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E. Management of Equipment. Property and Information Technology

Throughout the Special Committee's investigation one of the more consistent themes heard from every quarter of the MPD and from citizens has been the apparent lack of resources available to officers in the field. Many officers and officials complained about the state of the MPD's equipment and facilities. They also noted MPD's inability to supply officers with the basic necessities for executing their mission.

The current situation of resource shortages has a number of causes. Budget cuts clearly have exacerbated the MPD's poor management capabilities. In turn, the MPD has failed to invest wisely what money it has received in infrastructure and long-term solutions. instead, the MPD has chosen to manage its finances on a crisis-by-crisis basis. The unacceptable physical condition of the Training Academy, described in Section C above. is but one example. The Special Committee investigated other examples of the MPD's property management practices — the MPD's automobile fleet; uniforms, equipment and other property; communications equipment; and information technology.

In addition to looking at issues peculiar to these specific areas, the Special Committee reviewed the MPD's budget and procurement processes generally. The Special Committee also heard testimony from two citizens who, through their community groups, assisted the MPD in making certain procurements.

MPD officials testified that great progress had been made over the course of the past year. Assistant Chief Michael Fitzgerald stated that his bureau was "leaps and bounds" above where it was a few years ago and that his personnel was "working smarter." Mr. Joseph Moore, head of the MPD's procurement office, that officers are getting their requests filled faster than before.

Tangible results are hard to find. For example, one issue of particular concern to members of the Special Committee was the reported lack of radar guns. In response to questions from members of the Special Committee, the MPD stated that the Department usually purchases radar guns with grant funds. The Special Committee learned that the real problem with radar guns is the failure to repair them. The MPD has only one person qualified to repair the guns and does not maintain a repair service contract with the manufacturer. Furthermore. testimony revealed that a recent request for funds to purchase spare parts had been denied by the Chief Financial Officer.⁶⁸ The radar gun issue is but one example of the lack of foresight demonstrated by the MPD. The planning and budgeting process should take into account such obvious items as equipment repair. To the extent that the MPD does not require the manufacturer to perform repairs, the MPD itself must allow for and provide the resources to keep all of its equipment in proper working order.

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1. The Procurement Process

The procurement process, although improving, still is not up to par. Eric Coard (Chief Financial Officer), Joe Moore (Procurement Officer), and Assistant Chief Michael Fitzgerald (Technical Services Bureau) testified concerning the many planned improvements for the MPD's procurement process. Additionally, Richard Fite, the District of Columbia's Chief Procurement Officer (CPO), testified concerning his plans for improving the procurement process with respect to all of the District s agencies, including the MPD.

The Special Committee contends. as Mr. Fite stated. that much of the MPD's procurement problems are traceable to inefficient contracting policy. Over 80% of the MPD's procurement transactions are valued at under $25,000. Yet, because the system is not automated, MPD expends nearly the same energy and resources on smaller transactions as it expends on million dollar procurements. This inefficiency causes the MPD to experience unnecessarily high transactions costs for small procurements. The MPD is not alone in this regard. Mr. Fite stated that every agency within the District government suffers from the same problem. To combat this problem, his office is installing the Management Requisition System ("MRS"), an automated system that will allow MPD and other city agencies to requisition items subject to blanket purchase agreements ("BPA") electronically. Part of this process is the creation of the "3-in-1 " form. This new form, which had already been designed at the time of the hearing, will reduce three requisition related forms to one. Mr. Fite s staff currently is working with the MPD, and the District's Fire Department, Emergency Medical Services Department and the District of Columbia Public Schools to identify items that should be the subject of BPAs. Once these items are placed on BPAs, the costs associated with small procurements should be reduced dramatically. Moreover, the speed with which the procurements are executed should increase. thereby providing the MPD with the items it needs when it needs them.

Testimony indicated that the MRS should be fully operational by the end of October 1998. In initial phase, MRS will allow the MPD to make procurements through the General Services Administration ("GSA") in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding with GSA that already is in place. As the MPD continues to organize its affairs and improve its performance. the Special Committee anticipates that reliance upon GSA should decrease. The MPD must begin moving toward establishing BPAs with vendors in the private sector and avoid the fees paid to GSA for its procurement services. A significant factor in the anticipated success of the MRS is that it will force the MPD to plan ahead. Many of MPD's current problems are due to a lack of strategic planning for procurements. The current effort headed by Mr. Fite will help eliminate poor planning habits.

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2. The Technical Services Bureau

As stated above, the Special Committee reviewed the condition of four operating units (Flee, Management, Property, Communications, and Information Services) within the MPD's Technical Services Bureau that have responsibility for procurements or managing the MPD's property. Each unit has issues peculiar to its specific function. Nevertheless, the Special Committee found that the units had some significant issues in common. For instance, each unit recently has made or is planning to make major structural changes in the way it makes procurements.

3. Fleet Management

At the time of the hearing on June 1, 1998, the MPD owned a total of 1,405 vehicles. The management of the MPD's automobile fleet has seen some tangible improvements over the past year. Today, more cars are on the street due to a change in the way the MPD procures services for collision repair. Nevertheless, problems continue to exist. For example, the MPD's non-collision repair cost could be reduced by instituting a routine maintenance program. The MPD also could better project its budget for such repairs if it would maintain a regular replacement schedule so that the age of the fleet would not have large fluctuations from year-to-year.

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4. Vehicle Repair

Robert Rose, director of the Fleet Management Division ("FMD") testified that FMD maintains five blanket purchase agreements ("BPAs") with private vendors to perform collision damage repairs. This is a new system that MPD has been using since January 1998.⁶⁹ The current system has decreased paperwork and increased efficiency.. Most cars are returned within two weeks.

As of March 21, 1998, only three cars were down for repair.⁷⁰ Witnesses and members of the Special Committee noted a visible improvement in the presence of vehicles on the street.

Repairs other than collision work are performed in-house at FMD. FMD maintains BPAs with vendors for parts and supplies.⁷¹ Staffing shortages remain a major concern for FMD s repair efforts. FMD is authorized to employ 57 positions (26 of which are mechanics). FMD. on paper. has a roster of 43 people, including 20 mechanics. Six mechanics. however are unavailable due to extended (over 2 years) worker's compensation claims. Two mechanics perform the new car preparation and one works exclusively on motorcycles.⁷² Because of these Staffing problems. FMD is unable to perform routine maintenance on the fleet. When a car comes in for repair. FMD can perform lube service but is unable to perform routine transmission, engine, and other tests to ensure that the systems are operating properly. The lack of a scheduled maintenance program increases long-term costs because FMD cannot detect and correct minor problems before they become major costs. Mr. Rose testified that FMD needs 3 or 4 additional mechanics in order to establish a scheduled maintenance program.

Across the nation, there are wide variations in the way different police departments manage their fleets. Thus, a direct comparison of the MPD's staffing level with the staffing of other departments would not be fruitful. Nevertheless, it is clear that FMD's staffing level has a negative impact of FMD's ability to perform its mission. Due to disability, retirement, and other personnel problems, FMD has only 13 of its authorized 26 mechanics available to work on over 1150 cars. This is not enough to get the job done.

Mr. Rose further testified that one way the MPD can reduce costs is by cutting down on the abuse and neglect that the fleet suffers at the hands of officers in the field. Rose stated that most of the in-house repair work could be prevented if drivers operated their vehicles more responsibly, and if vehicle maintenance officers ("VMO") at the district level promptly reported minor problems. Rose also noted that abuse and neglect could have a negative impact on the MPD's ability to outsource management of the fleet because most private fleet managers would require the MPD to pay separately for repairs caused by abuse and neglect.

Commander Monroe stated that the MPD needs to hold drivers, VMOs, and commanders responsible for the condition of the vehicles.⁷³ He stated that officials must raise awareness on the part of the officers to take pride in the MPD's property. He also suggested allowing districts to use neighborhood vendors to perform routine jobs. such as oil changes and providing more driving skills training to officers.. The Special Committee supports holding officers, VMOs and Commanders responsible for abuse or neglect of MPD property. The Special Committee also recommends that the MPD provide more driving skills training as a component of its in-service training program. As for using local vendors, the Special Committee believes that decision is best left to the management discretion of the MPD.

The problems at FMD have been exacerbated by questionable management decisions. For example, at MPD's expense, MPD sent one officer. to "appraisal school." The rationale was the a trained MPD appraiser presumably would reduce dependence on an outside appraiser. Shortly after he finished school, the MPD transferred that officer. to patrol duty in its recent effort to put more uniformed officers on the street. Thus, the MPD derived no benefit for its expenditures on that officer's appraisal training and continues to rely solely on the advice of one retained outside appraiser.

Another issue adversely affecting FMD's ability to perform its mission is the lack of certain necessary equipment. For example, FMD does not have the equipment necessary to perform engine emissions tests. Thus, the MPD may be using vehicles that do not satisfy federal emissions standards. FMD also does not own any engine diagnostic equipment that would allow it to identify engine problems at an early stage.

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5. Vehicle Purchases

The Department's purchases of vehicles has been inconsistent, at best. Due in part to budgetary constraints the MPD has purchased hundreds of cars in some years and less than 10 in other years.⁷⁴ Because of this inconsistent purchasing, the average age of the fleet varies from year to year. For this reason, FMD is unable accurately to predict maintenance costs. The MPD needs to purchase approximately 150 cars per year just to keep the fleet operational. MPD should purchase 200 vehicles per year for the next 5 years in order to achieve an optimal replacement schedule. After that, the MPD should be able to purchase 100 vehicles per year to maintain a five-year replacement schedule. This year the MPD has budgeted the purchase of only 66 vehicles.⁷⁵ These cars were ordered through the GSA in November 1997 ⁷⁶ The Special Committee confirmed that FMD received 66 1998 Ford Crown Victoria vehicles in July 1998.⁷⁷ The MPD recently commissioned a consulting firm conduct a study of the MPD's fleet procurement and maintenance practices. The study revealed that the MPD is at the high end of the scale in terms of total costs for its fleet.⁷⁸ The MPD has been investigating alternatives to the current system. including the total or partial outsourcing of the fleet. Assistant Chief Fitzgerald indicated that MPD was leaning toward participating in the District's Master Lease Program beginning in FY 1999-2000 whereby the MPD would begin leasing all of its vehicles. The MPD also is close to issuing a Request for Proposals for fleet procurement and maintenance, in response to Mr. Coard's May 27, 1998 recommendation to outsource fleet management.⁷⁹

The Department also needs to work with other agencies to facilitate the sale or other disposal of surveyed and seized vehicles. The MPD has had difficulty getting vehicles to auction due to poor record keeping by the Department of Public Works ("DPW"). DPW will not allow MPD to sell a vehicle without a title. There have been a number of occasions in which DPW's records inaccurately reflected that there was no title for a particular car. The MPD actually has produced titles to cars when DPW asserts that none exists. One suggestion for remedying the problem is to require DPW to send a copy of each title to FMD and the Property Disposal Unit of the Department of Administrative Services. This could help facilitate better record keeping and quicker disposal of unusable vehicles. The Property Disposal Unit also has delayed the disposal process because that organization has been unable to auction MPD vehicles due to alleged problems with the lease on the lot used for auctions. Thus, many cars have been stored under the overpass next to FMD because Property Disposal has not held auctions.

Finally, the Special Committee noted that FMD s facilities, which also house the mobile crime unit, are in excellent condition. Unfortunately, the city does not own the property. Currently the MPD pays $75,000/month in rent on a lease that runs through April 2000. The Special Committee recommends that the MPD investigate the feasibility and benefits of acquiring the property.

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6. Property Division

The Property Division is responsible for the handling of evidence, uniforms and equipment and material management. The current commander of the Property Division is inspector Abraham Parks.

Inspector Parks recommended that the evidence function be separated from other property functions. He noted that a civilian could manage the non-evidence functions. The Special Committee reviewed the practices of Chicago and Boston and 12 other police departments through the assistance of staff of the Police Executive Research Forum ("PERF"). Each other department surveyed separates the administration of evidence-related property from other property functions. The Special Committee recommends that the MPD review the current organizational structure of the Property Division in light of what appears to be the standard for law enforcement agencies across the nation.

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7. Criminal Evidence

Members of the Special Committee were very concerned that MPD keeps seized currency at the facility rather than deposit it in an interest-bearing account at a financial institution. Failure to deposit seized currency raises security concerns and results in the District government foregoing substantial interest that could otherwise be earned. It was Co-Chair Evans' understanding that the United States Attorney has no objection to depositing cash. Assistant Chief Michael Fitzgerald testified that he understood that the USAO was in the process of writing a policy on the issue. Inspector Parks stated that it was his understanding that the D.C. Code required the money to be stored. rather than deposited in a bank. The Special Committee was unable to determine the cause of the confusion, but the conflicting statements indicate that on this issue, as on many others, the problem is the refusal of the various agencies involved to take the initiative to correct known problems. The USAO apparently has no objection. Indeed, Department of Justice policy provides for such deposits.⁸⁰ The MPD has no objection. Indeed, the MPD wants to deposit cash into an interest-bearing account. Nevertheless. the problem persists.

In the absence of MPD initiative, the Special Committee has drafted a statute specifically addressing this issue, which is included in the omnibus legislation. The proposed legislation authorizes the MPD to photograph all seized cash and record the serial numbers of each bill. The MPD will then make the photographs available to the U.S. Attorney for use in criminal trials. After the photographs have been taken, the MPD will deposit all seized cash into an interest bearing account. If currency has a particular evidentiary value (e.g., because of a dye marker). a prosecutor with his or her supervisor's approval could request a waiver from the policy on a case-by-case basis.

With respect to evidence generally. the Special Committee is satisfied that MPD's procedures are sufficient to protect the integrity of evidence used in criminal cases. The MPD has been using a computerized tracking system since 1995. At the time of the hearing. Property Division had a 20-year backlog of evidentiary property. MPD has established a 6-member "purge team" whose sole responsibility is the appropriate disposition of old evidence. The team reviews felony cases ever! year, misdemeanor cases every 6 months, and found property every 90 days for destruction. MPD also is working with the USAO to identify dated evidence that can be destroyed. The Special Committee supports the MPD in its efforts to destroy unnecessary evidence. and applauds the agencies' cooperation in this area.⁸¹

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8. Uniforms and Equipment

MPD had operated under a quartermaster system for decades.⁸² A new system directs officers to order uniforms directly from two vendors. This system permits MPD to purchase items as needed. rather than accumulate excess inventory. One vendor is responsible for blouses and shirts for the Class A uniforms. The second vendor is responsible for utility uniforms and other items. Contracts with vendors for uniforms have not been working as well as anticipated. The vendors have been in litigation with each other over the scope of the contracts and one vendor has been substantially unable to perform. Inspector Parks testified that the non-performing vendor simply does not have the capacity to handle an organization as large as the MPD.

An alternative arrangement is an allotment system. Officers could obtain suitable garments from any vendor selling approved goods, using a cash allotment provided by the Department each year. Once the officer. entire allotment, he must use personal funds to obtain any additional equipment. The Special Committee has reviewed other departments (e.g., Boston, Chicago) that have such a system. The system apparently works well in those departments because it is efficient and promotes accountability among the officers. Another option is the expansion of MPD's current voucher system to include any vendor who could supply conforming goods. The MPD could provide each officer. with a non-cash voucher allotment that could be used to purchase goods from any vendor selling approved equipment. Under either system, officers would be issued MPD specifications to ensure consistency of uniforms.

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9. Material Management

Material management encompasses the delivery of procured items (e.g., office supplies) to the units in the field. Generally, the current material management system appears to function effectively; however, the system in the past has been plagued with material shortages and delivery difficulties. Previously, the system permitted vendors to deliver supplies and equipment to the individual who made the request. Currently, the Property Division receives most deliveries and distributes the items to the requesting parties. While this system adds a level of administration. it helps inventory control and ensures that MPD receives goods of a consistent quality regardless of which unit placed the order. The Special Committee believes that use of a computer tracking (i.e., bar code) system would further improve inventory control.

Despite the improvements made under the new system, problems remain with respect to the distribution of supplies to field units. One witness called the requisition process "uneven" in that certain items inexplicably are easier to obtain than others. Moreover, the Special Committee noted that many citizens still complain about officers and police districts lacking basic supplies such as fax paper. copy paper, etc. The Property Division assured the Special Committee that such complaints should no longer be an issue, but reports of such problems persisted as of the Special Committee's final hearing on July 17, 1998. An MPD volunteer at the Third District testified about acute shortages of office supplies during critical weekend shifts and instances of officer. hoarding of such supplies. To the extent that communication problems may be a cause of the apparent disconnect among the Property Division, the field units and the citizens (i.e., officers being unaware that the Property Division can supply certain goods), the Special Committee recommends that the MPD take steps to ensure that these problems are corrected.

Finally, as with the Fleet Management Division, the Special Committee is concerned about the status of MPD's lease on the facility housing the Property Division. Currently, MPD occupies the Shepherd facility on a month-to-month lease. Testimony revealed that significant development is occurring in the neighborhood and there is concern that the landlord eventually will evict the MPD. The Special Committee recommends that the MPD plan to secure an alternative suitable site as soon as possible. Storing evidence in a facility subject to a month-to-month lease is not acceptable.

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10. Communications Division

The Communications Division is responsible for handling emergency and non-emergency telephone calls and all radio dispatches.⁸³ Captain Joel Maupin is the acting director of the Communications Division.

a. The 911 System

The communications system actually is two systems. First, there is the Bell Atlantic Enhanced 911 System, which citizens use to place emergency (911) and non-emergency (727-1010) calls. The system separates and prioritizes calls by the number dialed and forwards them to telephone receipt clerks. The telephone receipt clerks are the individuals who interact with citizens making calls for service. They obtain the information necessary for dispatching officers. The second system is the Computer Automated Dispatch ("CAD") system. After receiving the caller's information, the telephone receipt clerks prioritize the call and send the information to the dispatcher through the CAD system. The dispatcher's job is to transmit the information to an officer in the field via radio dispatch.

The Special Committee s primary concern with respect to the Communications Division was the number of citizen complaints about delays in getting through on the emergency line and alleged instances of rudeness on the part of the emergency operators. MPD's own statistics show that the Division is not meeting its stated goals: to answer emergency calls within 5 seconds and non-emergency calls with 12 seconds.⁸⁴ In fact, the delay has gotten worse each year for the past 3 years. Despite the increasing delays, Captain Maupin assured the Special Committee that citizens should never hear a busy signal. If the call is not answered between 7 and 9 rings then the caller receives a recording instructing them to wait for the next available operator. Capt. Maupin cautioned that the caller should never hang up and call back because they will lose their place in line to receive a response.

The Special Committee finds that a primary cause of the poor performance of the Communications Division is related to personnel issues. The current 911 and CAD systems support 15 telephone receipt clerks and eight dispatchers. Communications has a minimum staffing requirement of 10 telephone receipt clerks and 11 dispatchers. If fully staffed according to Communication Division guidelines, 10 clerks and 11 dispatchers adequately would serve the MPD's needs; however, Communications often does not have its full complement of personnel. The testimony showed that the Communications Division often does not meet its own minimum staffing standards. There are times when the Communications Division may have as few as 5 telephone receipt clerks on duty due to employee absence. This is due, in part, to high civilian turnover. At the time of the hearing, Communications had approximately 30 vacancies requiring the unit to spend over 100 hours of overtime each week. For example, from January 1998 to the July 17. 1998 hearing, Communications lost 5 civilians and replaced only 2. Of those 30 vacancies. 22 were vacancies for telephone receipt clerks. This vacancy rate has remained fairly stable over time. Additionally, the low staffing rate appears to be related to abuse of sick leave.

Testimony indicated that the high turnover and the abuse of sick leave can be traced to high stress levels and low pay. The current entry level pay for a telephone receipt clerk is DS-6 at an annual salary of $22,000. This rate of compensation is significantly lower than similar jobs in other jurisdictions.⁸⁵ Moreover, when added to the stress caused by the nature of the job (over 4.500 calls are received each day),⁸⁶ high turnover and high absences are a foreseeable result. The Communications Division conducted a desk audit of all positions in Communications and has requested a pay raise for the entry level position to DS-7 at an annual salary of $23,000 and a corresponding one level raise for all other positions. The Special Committee supports the increase in pay for civilian employees at the Communications Division. Furthermore, the Special Committee recommends that the MPD investigate methods of reducing stress for all employees of the Communications Division, and that MPD provide resources to assist employees in dealing with the stress attendant to that function.

The Special Committee inquired as to whether the MPD had a "reverse 911" system in place. A ' reverse 911" system would allow the MPD to notify community leaders and other citizens in the event of an alert. Maupin stated that MPD operates the "Citywatch" program. The Citywatch program is a computerized system that allows the MPD, among other things, to send voice or fax messages to an unlimited number of telephone destinations. Contact lists can be developed for neighborhoods, government leaders, or community activists to instantly provide them with needed information. The Special Committee is unaware, however, of any situations in which the system has been used.

The Communications Division also is in the process of obtaining a new Computer Automated Dispatch system that also services the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department. While the primary causes of poor service are related to personnel issues, the Communications equipment also is inadequate. The current system allows the Communications Division to keep track of only 75 patrol cars, whereas the MPD may have in excess of 200 cars in service at any given time. Any new system obtained by the MPD must be capable of tracking at least 200 cars. A new system, along with the installation of mobile digital computers ("MDCs"), will assist in shortening officer response time by decreasing the amount of air traffic through dispatchers.⁸⁷ Over-the-air dispatches should be reserved for the most serious emergencies. The new system and Communications personnel will occupy a new facility on MacMillan Drive in December 1999.

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11. Information Services Division

The Information Services Division ("ISD") is responsible for the procurement. installation. and management of all of the MPD's information technology. This office reviews and approves all requests for information technology. Ms. Deborah Wright is the current head of ISD.

a. The IT Initiative

Ms. Wright testified concerning the MPD's plans to acquire new information technology. These plans are detailed in the MPD's "IT Initiative," which is a four-year $48.9 million plan to carry the MPD's information systems into the 21st century.⁸⁸ Among other things, the initiative includes plans to replace all outdated computers with new high performance personal computers, the installation of new criminal identification systems, and the installation of mobile digital computers in all patrol cars and many detective cars. The plans also include the replacement of the MPD's aging mainframe computer. A number of these plans already are underway and are awaiting full funding.

Eric Coard testified concerning the current plans for funding the IT Initiative. The current mans are as follows:

FY 1998 $4.8 million of the $10 million in Management Reform is earmarked to IT. $2.6 million in grants already awarded to MPD. $4.8 million expected after receiving letter of intent to award COPS MORE grant.

FY 1999 $17.9 million from capital budget. $2.0 million from COPS MORE grant.

FY2000 $9.6 million from capital budget.

FY2001 $7.6 million from capital budget.

The ultimate goal of the IT Initiative is to reduce the time that officers spend on routine paperwork. For example, the Records Management System, mobile digital computers. and automated police reports - all of which are underway — will allow officers to file reports electronically rather than having an officer travel to the district to file a paper report. Another goal of the IT Initiative is to integrate all of the city's information technology. For example. the MPD hopes that civil protective orders from the courts eventually will be accessible via the MDCs. thereby allowing officers to be more responsive to domestic violence situations.

As with the Communications Division ISD is experiencing significant personnel problems. The public sector faces intense competition with private sector employers for IT professionals. The District's pay scale is well below both the private sector and the federal government pay scales. Because of the salary differential, the MPD frequently is unable to hire top personnel. Even when the MPD is able to hire good people, it is unable to keep them because of the lure of higher salaries from other employers. Moreover, there are no funds available for Information Services ("IS") training. Information technologies are changing rapidly and it is necessary to train professionals to keep up with emerging technologies. Because of these personnel challenges, Wright believes that MPD wastes money on paying outside consultants for work that could be done in-house if ISD were properly staffed. trained, and compensated. The Special Committee makes two recommendations in this regard. First, the Special Committee recommends establishing a separate pay scale for IS professionals designed to keep salaries in parity with federal government positions. Second, the Special Committee recommends that MPD earmark funds for the continuing education of IS professionals.

Finally, the MPD assured the Special Committee that all new technology acquisitions and any upgrades to existing technology will be Year 2000 compliant.

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12. Recommendations

The Special Committee recommends that MPD:

(1) Establish a routine vehicle maintenance program for all vehicles.

(2) Hold drivers and vehicle maintenance officers accountable for abuse or neglect of MPD property.

(3) Reduce the overall cost of fleet maintenance, either through outsourcing or internal reforms.

(4) Separate the administrative functions for handling evidence from the remainder of Property Division functions.

(5) Consider alternatives to the current uniform procurement system, including an allotment system or increasing the number of vendors participating in the voucher system to ensure that non-performance by any one vendor will not adversely affect the MPD.

(6) implement a bar code or similar computer-automated monitoring system for better inventory control.

(7) Conduct a comprehensive facilities audit, including a review of all leased properties with a view toward purchase of the property or occupancy of a suitable facility under a long-term lease.

(8) Increase salaries for Communications Division personnel. Provide enhanced stress relief resources for Communications Division employees.

(9) Fund the IT Initiative.

The Special Committee recommends that the Council adopt legislation:

(1) Consistent with the proposed omnibus bill to authorize the deposit of cash in an interest bearing account with an approved financial institution.