Court of Appeals Judgment
June 24, 2000

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No. 00-CV-778

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL., Appellants, v.
DINO JOSEPH DRUDI,, Appellee.

BEFORE: Ruiz, Reid and Washington, Associate Judges.

CA4716-00

JUDGMENT

On consideration of the notice of appeal, appellants' motion for summary reversal and request for expedition and oral argument, the opposition and reply thereto, appellee's motion to strike the notice of appeal, and upon oral argument, it is

ORDERED that appellee's motion to strike the notice of appeal is denied. The grant or denial of a motion for temporary restraining order is appealable where for all practical purposes the rights of appellants will be irretrievably lost absent review. See Uricolo v. Washington, 305 A2d. 252 (D.C. 1973). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary reversal is granted and the court's June 22, 2000, order directing that "the results of the Special Election regarding School Governance Charter Amendment Act of 2000, to be held on June 27, 2000, shall not be counted, publicized or certified, or in any manner transmitted by the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys or any person in active concert or participation with them..." is hereby vacated.

We are not persuaded that appellee has sustained his burden of showing that there is a substantial likelihood that he, rather than appellants, will prevail on the merits. The purpose of the statutory requirement of two legislative readings is, "to give notice of a pending proposal so that `the public and interested parties can discuss [the] legislation' before passage." District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1980)(en banc)(a case involving the passage of emergency legislation)(quoting Staff of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Home Rule for the District of Columbia 1973-1974 at 1042 (Comm. Print 1974). Given the unique requirements of the District of Columbia Charter amendment procedures, a proposed amendment passed by the Council must be ratified by District of Columbia citizens before it becomes law. See D.C. Code §1-205. There is no allegation that there was a failure to adequately publicize the proposal that is the subject of the referendum as required by law. Accordingly, we conclude that the balance of the harms alleged by the parties favors removing any possible cloud on the voters' expression on the proposed chatter amendment.

PER CURIAM

Copies to:

Honorable Margaret Haywood
Clerk, Superior Court
Charles L. Reischel, Esquire Deputy Corporation Counsel
Charlotte Brookins-Hudson, Esquire Office of General Counsel
Kenneth H. Rosenau, Esquire 1424 16th Street, N.W., Suite 502 Washington, D.C. 20036-2211