MPD Chief Charles Ramsey and Mayor
Anthony Williams held these report secret and refused to release them
until they were ordered to make them public by US District Court Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan on September 11, 2003. Councilmember Kathy Patterson had
requested the release of internal MPD reports on February 26,
2003.
Force
Investigation Team report, January
25, 2003 |
Final report by
Force Investigation Team, undated |
Chief Charles Ramsey
memorandum to Mayor Williams, March 13, 2003 |
Press release from
Councilmember Kathy Patterson, February 26, 2003 |
US
District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, order in the cases of Rayming
Chang et al., Plaintiffs, v. United States, et
al., Defendants, Civ. Action No. 02-2010; Jeffrey Barham, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles Ramsey, et al., Defendants,
Civ. Action No. 02-2283; and Franklin Jones, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants,
Civ. Action No. 02-2310; September 12, 2003 |
Metropolitan Police
Office of Professional Responsibility
Civil Rights & Force Investigations Division
51 N Street, Northeast, Suite 400, Washington D.C., 20002 202-724-4269
January 25, 2003
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
TO: Chief of
Police
THRU: Acting Assistant Chief of Police
Office of Professional Responsibility
THRU: Director Civil Rights and Force Investigation Division
FROM: Commander
Force Investigation Team
SUBJECT: Report Relative to Complaints of Alleged
Misconduct Made at the October 24, 2002, Hearing of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Council of the District of Columbia, Concerning the IMF/World
Bank Protests
This memorandum addresses complaints of alleged
misconduct made at the October 24, 2002, Hearing of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Council of the District of Columbia concerning the IMF/World
Bank Protests.
BACKGROUND
During the weekend of September 27th through the 29th,
2002, the World Bank and the international Monetary Fund (IMF) held
their annual meetings at their headquarters located in downtown
Washington, D.C. Intelligence gathered prior to the event, coupled with
information disseminated to the media by protest group leaders,
indicated that several groups sought to "shut down the city"
by way of blocking major intersections leading into and around
Washington. Moreover, a "Scavenger Hunt" was publicized via
the Internet —a game of sorts that sought to reward participants with
"points" for acts of vandalism throughout the city.
On Friday, September 27, 2002, approximately 400
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank protestors, who were part
of a larger group of protesters, marched throughout downtown Washington,
D.C. and finally gathered at Pershing Park, located at 15 and
Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest. Shortly thereafter, the demonstrators
were encircled by members of the Metropolitan Police and United States
Park Police Departments and were prohibited from exiting the park.
MPD Assistant Chief Peter J. Newsham was responsible for
Area IV of the World Bank/IMF demonstration detail, which encompassed
the Pershing Park. While on the scene at Pershing Park, Assistant Chief
Newsham gave an order to arrest the protesters for "Failure to obey
a police order," based on his personal observations and discussions
with several MPD Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) command officials on the
scene. Specifically, he observed the protestors violate traffic laws in
a dangerous manner, turn over newspaper boxes, and ignore officers'
orders to get out of the street and onto the sidewalks.
An order was given to Metropolitan Police Department
Civil Disturbance Unit managers by Assistant Chief Newsham to arrest
everyone in the park and transport them to the Institute of Police
Science (IPS) for processing. Metro Buses were used to transport
prisoners to the IPS.
Each prisoner was escorted from a transport bus through
the front doors of the IPS. Every prisoner was photographed,
fingerprinted, and his or her arrest paperwork was completed. In cases
where no other charges were pending, arrestees could elect to be
released and pay collateral or receive a citation date to appear in
court at a later time. If arrestees had outstanding warrants or other
holding charges, they were transported to court to appear before a
judge.
During detainment at the IPS the arrestees sat on floor
mats and were flexi-cuffed1, strong hand wrist to opposite ankle, with a
third flexi-cuff in-between their hand and foot. As needed, the
prisoners' flexi-cuffs were removed as they were escorted to use
restroom facilities and. to stretch. The
length of detainment varied, but in some cases lasted as long as
eighteen (18) hours. (Photographs depicting the type of Flexi-cuffs
utilized are attached to this report.) [Photographs are not available
online.]
The delay in prisoner processing was due to a temporary
failure and scheduled unavailability of the information systems. The
digital cameras that were used to take prisoner photographs functioned
slowly because they could not handle the volume of pictures taken. The
computer server used for prisoner processing crashed,. and processing
was delayed to trouble-shoot the problem. Moreover, routine updates to
the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) database scheduled on
Saturday, September 28, 2002, at approximately 3:00 A.M., caused
additional delays. These delays were compounded by Prisoner Control's
failure to immediately implement manual backup procedures when the
automated system became unavailable.
On October 24, 2002, three (3) complainants testified at
the hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the
District of Columbia. At that hearing, the complainants alleged that
they were unlawfully arrested and detained for an unreasonable period of
time. Furthermore, the individuals testified that they were
"hogtied" while detained by the Metropolitan Police
Department. The complaint was received by the office of Professional Responsibility,
and assigned to the Civil Rights and Force Investigations Division,
Force Investigation Team for investigation.
Metropolitan Police Department Members Interviewed
In order to further this examination, numerous MPD
members were interviewed about their recollection of the events that
took place in and around Pershing Park on the day in question. Only
those members identified as having specific and relevant information
about the events at the park were interviewed. The following is a
summary of the statements given by each member.
Assistant Chief Peter Newsham
Assistant Chief Peter Newsham is in charge of the Office
of Professional Responsibility. Assistant Chief Newsham explained that
his assignment during the IMF/World Bank demonstrations on Friday,
September 27, 2002, was Zone IV, which included Pershing Park. Assistant
Chief Newsham related that hundreds of demonstrators were converging
from different directions and moving toward Pershing Park. Assistant
Chief Newsham related that he personally observed demonstrators turning
over newspaper stands and ignoring officers' orders to get out of the
street and onto the sidewalks.
Assistant Chief Newsham was asked if any warnings were
given to the demonstrators prior to the mass arrest at Pershing Park,
and replied that the conduct of the demonstrators was such that they
were clearly violating traffic laws in a dangerous manner. Assistant
Chief Newsham related that some of the demonstrators were warned by
officers along their route to get onto the sidewalk and out of the
street, however the demonstrators ignored the warnings. Assistant Chief
Newsham further explained that it was not practical to give everyone a
warning or to make sure that every person received a warning at the
point where all of the protesters converged at Pershing Park. Assistant
Chief Newsham related that the demonstrators were arrested for
disorderly conduct and failure to obey officer's orders for violations
that occurred prior to their entering Pershing Park.
Chief Newsham was asked to describe Assistant Chief Brian
Jordan's involvement on the scene of the arrests. Chief Newsham
explained that he recalled seeing Chief Jordan on the scene; however,
Chief Jordan was outside of his assigned zone and therefore made no
command decisions relating to any operational issues.
Captain Andrew Solberg
Captain Andrew Solberg is an Assistant District Commander
at the Fourth District. Captain Solberg stated that on September 27,
2002, he was assigned as the Fourth District CDU Commander for the IMF/World
Bank demonstrations. At approximately 9:00 A.M., while
in charge of the Fourth District CDU bicycle platoon, he monitored a group of demonstrators on bicycles from Union Station;
through the downtown area to Pershing Park located at
15th and Pennsylvania, Avenue. The purpose for monitoring this non-permitted movement was to ensure that all
necessary traffic measures were taken both by the demonstrators and
police.
Captain Solberg related that once he arrived at Pershing
Park, he met with Assistant Chief Brian Jordan and Assistant Chief Peter
Newsham. Captain Solberg explained that he was then instructed to
position his CDU platoon in such away that it blocked off access to and
from the south and east sides of the park. He was informed that everyone
inside Pershing Park would be arrested. The parade was conducted without
a permit, and in violation of Title 18 of the DCMR (Vehicles and
Traffic).
Captain Solberg was asked if he gave, heard, or had any
knowledge of an order being given to the protestors in the park to
disperse, or that failing to do so would result in arrest. Captain
Solberg replied that he did not. According to Captain Solberg, Assistant
Chief Jordan relayed to him that an order had been given earlier that
morning to a group of people congregating in the intersection of 14th
and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest. This order was given prior to
Captain Solberg's arrival at Pershing Park at 9:00 A.M.
Lieutenant Jeffery Harold
Lieutenant Jeffery Harold is assigned to the Special
Operations Division. Lieutenant Harold was responsible for monitoring
the activities of the protesters as well as MPD members and provide
assistance and advice as needed. Lieutenant Harold stated that at one
point, he was on the scene of the mass arrests at Pershing Park, and was
asked if he had knowledge of an order being given to the protesters at
the park to disperse or be subjected to arrest. Lieutenant Harold stated
that he was unaware if an order was given to the crowd prior to the.
mass arrests. Lieutenant Harold further indicated that no permits were
issued for any parades or marches, either in or around Pershing Park on
that day for any of the groups in the area.
United States Park Police Major Rick Murphy
The Force Investigation Team interviewed U.S. Park Police
Major Rick Murphy via the telephone. Major Murphy was a Captain at the
time of this incident, and has since been promoted and reassigned to
duties in New York.
Major Murphy explained that he was on the scene at
Pershing Park on September 27, 2002, and witnessed the group of
protesters being contained within the park. Major Murphy further
detailed a conversation he had with Assistant Chief Newsham in which, he
in effect, told the chief that he would not arrest the protesters in the
park.
Major Murphy indicated that the protesters' actions in
the park did not meet the criteria for mass arrests based on U.S Park
Police protocols. He advised that in similar situations, the protesters
would first be warned to disperse and then given ample time to do so.
However, Major Murphy did indicate that he assisted MPD with positioning
numerous Park Police officers around the park so as to
prevent anyone from leaving. Major Murphy was
interviewed via telephone because of his location in New York.
Inspector Joel Maupin
Inspector Joel Maupin is the Deputy Director of the
Institute of Police Science (IPS). Inspector Maupin was the MPD command
official in charge of the prisoner processing facility at the IPS during
the IMF detail. When asked about the prisoner processing procedures at
the I PS, Inspector Maupin discussed the processing, detainment, release
and/or transport of arrestees to court. The inspector explained that
each prisoner was escorted from a transport bus through the front doors
of the IPS. Each prisoner was photographed, fingerprinted, and his or
her arrest paperwork was completed. If there were no other charges
pending, arrestees could elect to be released and either pay a
collateral or receive a citation to appear in court on a future date. If
arrestees had outstanding warrants or other holding charges, they were
transported to court.
While detained at IPS, the arrestees were
flexi-cuffed-strong hand wrist to their opposite ankle-with a flexi-cuff
in-between their wrist and ankle. Additionally, when asked about
prisoners being handcuffed during processing, he stated that the
prisoners' flexi-cuffs were removed during the processing procedures and
were re-flexi-cuffed; one wrist to the opposite ankle in front of their
body once the processing was complete. As needed, the prisoners'
flexi-cuffs were removed as they were escorted to use restroom
facilities and to periodically stretch.
Captain Cleora Sharkey
Captain Cleora Sharkey is the Operations Commander at the
Major Narcotics Branch. Captain Sharkey related that she was one of the
operations officials in charge of the prisoner processing facility.
Captain Sharkey stated that she prepared the operational plan and
scheduled the personnel for the IMF detail. Captain Sharkey was asked if
a briefing was given to the officials detailed to the IPS for prisoner
processing. She replied that a briefing was indeed given to discuss the
operational plan. According to Captain Sharkey, several officials with
prisoner control responsibilities were in attendance, although she could
not recall exactly whom.
When asked about the detainment procedures used while the
arrestees were inside the gymnasium portion of the Institute of Police
Science, Captain Sharkey explained that the arrestees were flexi-cuffed,
strong wrist to their opposite ankle with a flexi-cuff in-between.
Captain Sharkey related that the middle flexi-cuff was removed when the
arrestees were escorted to the restroom. She further stated that it was
necessary to use this technique to handcuff prisoners because there was
no holding facility and this measure was taken so that prisoners could
not run around freely. Additionally, she stated that there was no
specific written policy in the IMF/World Bank operational manual for
handcuffing procedures at the processing facility.
Captain Sharkey was asked if there
were any Information Technology (IT) problems at the processing facility. She related that there was a
delay because the digital cameras could not handle the
volume of prisoner photos taken. She advised that the prisoner processing computer server overloaded and
"crashed" during the midnight tour of duty for the next day.
Additionally, due to updates on September 28, at approximately 3:00 A.M.
to the CJIS database, major delays to prisoner processing occurred.
Civilian Witnesses
The following witnesses testified at the October 24th,
2002 Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the
District of Columbia concerning the IMF/World Bank Protests. Extensive
interviews were not conducted with these individuals due to pending
litigation and the presence of counsel2.
Statement of Mr. Joseph Mayer
Mr. Mayer stated that he was arrested in Pershing Square
in relation to the IMF/Worid Bank protests. The complainant reported
that he went to Pershing Square on Pennsylvania Avenue along with his
daughter. Mr. Mayer explained that the police came into the park and did
not allow anyone to leave. Mr. Mayer further related that he was
subsequently handcuffed, placed on a bus, and driven to the police
academy where he was later processed..
Mr. Mayer went on to describe how he was restrained
during his detention. Once the bus arrived at the training academy, the
handcuffs were moved from behind his back to the front so that his hands
were now placed in front of him. Once at the academy, Mr. Mayer was
allowed to use the restroom, and his handcuffs were removed until he was
finished. Mr. Mayer further related that once inside the gymnasium, he
was restrained and placed on a mat. Mr. Mayer described the restraining
as having a wrist attached to his ankle, "short enough so that you
couldn't stand up or stretch out if you were laying down."
Statement of Ms. Julie Abbate
Ms. Julie Abbate stated that she was arrested in Pershing
Square in relation to the IMF/World Bank protests. Ms. Abbate further
explained that she went to Pershing Square out of curiosity and was not
allowed to leave the park after the police moved in. Ms. Abbate related
that when she later realized that arrests were inevitable, she
volunteered to be placed under arrest. Ms. Abbate explained that once
arrested, she was moved onto a bus and transported to the police
academy. Upon arrival at the academy, Ms. Abbate was photographed along
with her arresting officer. Ms. Abbate related that when asked to pay
the fifty-dollar fine, she. refused and requested a citation because she
was just a bystander and an attorney, and did not want a record of any
sort.
Ms. Abbate explained that she was then moved to another
processing line so that she could be accommodated and receive a citation
date instead of paying the fine. However, she was first restrained and
placed on a mat inside the gymnasium. Ms. Abbate related that she was
told that once all of the prisoners that elected to pay the fine were processed, those electing for citation release
would be processed immediately thereafter. Ms. Abbate further related
that she later learned that she could not receive a citation as the
courts were open for business at that time. Ms. Abbate was later
transferred over to the District of Columbia Superior Court where she
was turned over to the United States Marshals Service. Ms. Abbate
described in detail the way she was thoroughly searched by the Marshals,
including having to remove several articles of clothing in front of
female Marshals and other inmates. Ms. Abbate stated that her case was
eventually "no-papered."
Ms. Abbate was again asked to describe how she was
restrained while inside of the gymnasium at the police academy. Ms.
Abbate explained that in order to be "cuffed," one had to sit
down on the floor because a "circle" was placed around the
wrist, another placed "close to your ankle," and another
connecting the two. Ms. Abbate further explained that the cuff around
the ankle was placed loosely enough so that it could be moved up and
down. Ms. Abbate related that the cuff was not placed so tightly so as
to cut off circulation. According to Ms. Abbate, when she and other
prisoners were allowed to use the restroom, the middle link would be cut
in order to allow them to walk.
Statement of Mr. Michael Eichler
Mr. Michael Eichler stated that he was arrested in
Pershing Park in relation to the IMF/World bank protests. He further
reported that he arrived at the park on a bicycle and that once he
entered the park, he was denied the opportunity to leave by police. He
also testified that at no point during his detainment in the park was he
ordered to leave the area. Mr. Eichler stated that he was subsequently
arrested and placed on a Metro bus. From there, Mr. Eichler was
transported to the training academy where he explained that he was
detained on the bus for several hours awaiting processing. Mr. Eichler
explained that he was later photographed and fingerprinted, then placed
on a mat inside of the gymnasium. According to Mr. Eichler, a
"zip" was placed around his wrist, another around his ankle,
and one in between the two. According to Mr. Eichler, the middle
"zip" between the arm and ankle was removed when prisoners
were escorted to the restroom. Mr. Eichler further described the
restraints as follows: "it would move, it wasn't so tight that it
could not move, but I could not move it past my calf or ankle." Mr.
Eichler was asked whether he was able to stand while in the restraints,
and replied that, "I could actually stand, but I could not stand
erect, probably the closest I could get to upright would have been maybe
at my back at ninety degrees." Mr. Eichler related that he was
detained for approximately fifteen hours.
All three complainants explained that
on the day in question, they were prevented from leaving the park, placed under arrest and subsequently
transported to the Institute of Police Science for
processing. While at the IPS, they were restrained by having one of their wrists flexi-cuffed to an opposite ankle. All three
complainants related that they were fed during their detention, given
restroom breaks, and had room to move as the flexi-cuffs were not placed
so tightly so as to cut off circulation or remain fixed in one place.
Video and Photographs
Members assigned to the prisoner processing detail at the
IPS took still digital photographs of the detention area in the
gymnasium. The photos depict the detainment area along with the
handcuffed prisoners. The photos further depict groups of prisoners
flexi-cuffed-wrist to opposite ankle-sitting on blue mats on the
gymnasium floor. Some prisoners are sitting upright and talking to other
prisoners nearby. Other prisoners are seen laying down sleeping.
Attached to this report are digital photographs of the
flexi cuffs utilized during the detainment, and a close-up photo of an
MPD member while restrained in this manner.
Videotapes were obtained that were taken by MPD personnel
assigned to record the demonstrations. The video segments depicting the
events at Pershing Park commence after all of the protesters were lead
into the park. The video further shows MPD and U.S. Park Police (both on
foot and mounted on horses) surrounding a large group of protesters.
Finally, the video depicts MPD officers entering the cordoned-off area,
physically grabbing hold of individual protesters, and placing them
under arrest. There is no video of the detention facility at the IPS.
Force Investigation Team investigators and managers scrutinized the
videotape at length. The tape does not reveal any new information
relative to this review.
Policy Review
The Force Investigation Team conducted a policy review
of the facts surrounding the department's arrest, transportation, and
detention procedures used during the IMF/World Bank protests.
Specifically, investigators and managers assessed the protocols used by
police commanders as they relate to arrests and prisoner processing
during this incident.
Moreover, decisions made by MPD command officials during
the events at Pershing Park were evaluated. FIT members have reviewed
the written procedures enumerated in the operational manual that was
created and implemented by the Special Services Command during the IMF/World
Bank demonstrations.
The following is a precise dissection of each category identified.
in this report as either a possible policy violation or one that is
ambiguously written, thereby leaving certain aspects open to individual
interpretation. Recommendations to remedy any noted deficiencies are
presented immediately following this review.
ARREST
On September 27, 2002, there were numerous protest groups
that later converged into Pershing Park. For instance, Fourth District
CDU bicycle squads monitored a group of bicyclists traveling from Union
Station to Pershing Park. Based on interviews with Captain Andrew
Solberg-the command official that oversaw the monitoring of the
bicyclists toward the park-no warnings were given to the riders that
they might be subjected to arrest. Moreover, they were followed to
Pershing Park and were allowed. to enter
the area blocked off by police.
Based on interviews and other facts gathered in this
case, it is possible that there were individuals in the park that were
not part of any groups headed toward the. park under continuous
observation by police. There is no evidence that the park had been
cleared before the larger group of protesters was allowed to enter the
park.
With regard to arrests, the following specific questions
were raised in order to further this review:
Why were the protesters in Pershing Park arrested?
The order to arrest the protesters in the park was given
by Assistant Chief Peter Newsham. Based on his account of events that
lead up to the order to arrest, groups of protesters were moving through
the streets and advancing toward the park. Assistant Chief Newsham
personally observed some of the violations, while other violations were
observed by other members of the department, and were relayed to him at
a later time. Specifically, Chief Newsham was aware of the following:
- Assistant Chief Newsham personally
observed a large group marching in the street and overturning newspaper
stands.
- It was relayed to Assistant Chief
Newsham that several protesters broke a bank window a few blocks away
and were becoming increasingly violent.
- It was relayed to Assistant Chief Newsham that
various protesters had illegally marched in the street and were ordered
innumerable times to get back onto the sidewalk.
Based on Assistant Chief Newsham's explanation, the
protesters in Pershing Park had committed violations before entering the
park. Groups of protesters were marching in the street and were
supposedly warned by officers to get back on the sidewalk.
Moreover, a group of bicyclists had
illegally traveled in a large group from Union Station toward the park, in violation of District of Columbia
traffic laws--Assistant Chief Newsham essentially used the park as a roadblock of
sorts, in which protesters who had already broken the law were stopped
and arrested.
Analysis:
It appears that the decision to arrest everyone at the
park was based on incomplete information. The demonstrators that
violated specific laws should have been separated or stopped at the time
the violations were observed and arrested. Pershing Park was used as the
holding area until the arrests could be affected. It is possible that
numerous persons inside of the park had arrived there lawfully. Several
clusters of demonstrators who committed separate violations were all
combined into one large group in the park and charged with Failure to
Obey a Police Officer.
It is a much easier task employing hindsight and
evaluating the decisions made by command officials months later, than
being in a position responsible for making those decisions in the field.
Furthermore, the decision must be evaluated in a specific context and
not in a vacuum. Specifically, protesters had threatened to "shut
down the city" on numerous occasions both to police and the media.
The MPD was tasked with not only safeguarding life and property in the
immediate area of the demonstrations, but also for maintaining clear and
safe passages into and throughout the city due to heightened terrorism
alerts. (See the attached flyers posted by protest groups on the
Internet threatening to "shut down the city").[Illustrations
not available online.]
It is clear that the judgment to arrest the protesters in
the park was made in good faith, and following an assessment of all of
the facts and circumstances. However, it cannot be established that all
of those persons in the park were part of any particular group engaged
in unlawful behavior.
Were the charges placed on the Pershing Park
demonstrators correct?
All of the demonstrators in the park were charged with
Failure to Obey an Officer. This is a District of Columbia traffic
regulation3 utilized primarily for purposes of ensuring that officers
tasked with directing traffic have the authority to direct motorists and
pedestrians in a proper and safe manner. The field arrest forms from
Pershing Park indicate that each arresting officer personally attested
to the fact that he or she saw the protester depicted in the form
engaging in unlawful activity, and individually gave a warning to cease
such activity.
Analysis
As previously stated, each arrest form from Pershing Park
indicates that a specific officer saw the listed demonstrator engaging
in unlawful activity-in this case, walking in the street-and
subsequently issued an order to that particular demonstrator to cease that activity by returning to the sidewalk. Further
review of this matter exposed that this was in fact not the case-none of
the officers could actually testify that he or she gave the defendant
described in the field arrest forma warning. In other words, officers
could not be accurately linked to the defendant pictured and arrested.
It is likely that several officers along the impromptu parade route
shouted at demonstrators to return to the sidewalk, but none could be
truly linked to a specific demonstrator.
It appears that this was an improper charge for this
particular event, and was somewhat of a departure from previous mass
demonstration arrest charges. The Failure to Obey an Officer charge
could have held up to judicial scrutiny if every arresting officer was
able to conclusively substantiate each of his or her arrests.
A more appropriate charge would have been Parading
Without a Permit for the protesters marching in the street, and
Incommoding or Disorderly Conduct for those engaged in that specific
behavior a few blocks away. In this manner, officers tasked with
arresting protesters could more easily explain the conduct they observed
as long as command officials on the scene of the mass arrests ensured
that each field arrest form properly illustrated that the listed officer
observed the listed defendant as part of a grout) engaged in whatever
illegal activity.
It is important to stress the point that each arresting
officer, by current MPD mass arrest standards, can arrest up to a
maximum of 15 demonstrators at one time, but must be able to testify
that he or she saw the defendant engaged in illegal activity as part of
a group. In other words, each officer will not necessarily be able to
identify each and every defendant in his cluster of arrestees, but will
be able to testify that the defendant was part of a group of protesters
that he or she observed engaged in illegal activity. Moreover, the field
arrest form and photograph of the defendant will further strengthen this
assertion. In the Pershing Park case, the arrest paperwork could not
support the claim that each officer personally warned each of the
defendants listed in the form.
Why were warnings to disperse not given in Pershing Park?
In the preliminary stages of this review, much of the
focus surrounded around the question: why were the protesters in the
park not warned or given an opportunity to leave?
According to MPD's Mass Demonstration Handbook, at least
two documented warnings prior to arrest must be made. This has been the
practice in previous mass arrest situations -- a Civil Disturbance Unit
command official would normally issue the warnings by utilizing a
bullhorn. In this manner, the demonstrators would be informed as to
which law they were violating, and that they would be subjected to
arrest if they fail to disperse. A key component of
this strategy is enabling the demonstrators to leave after the initial
warnings are given.
The examination of the Pershing Park arrests has revealed
that no warnings were given to the demonstrators in the park. A review
of the videotape, which captured the arrests at the park, does not
reveal any warnings given. Moreover, Assistant Chief Newsham, Captain
Solberg, Park Police Major Murphy, and numerous other interviewed
individuals stated that they heard no warnings to disperse given by
police.
Analysis
Assistant Chief Peter Newsham, the MPD command official
in charge of the zone encompassing Pershing Park, stated that no
warnings were given to the demonstrators because they had essentially
been warned before entering the park. According to Chief Newsham, prior
to arriving in the park, the protesters had committed violations while
en route to the park, and had been warned countless times by officers to
disperse, to get back on the sidewalk, and to cease their disorderly
doings.
There is no conclusive evidence to support the fact that
demonstrators were warned before entering the park. However, once
carefully examined, the relevancy of whether warnings were given in the
park came into question. Chief Newsham explained that warnings were not
given, nor were any required because in his mind, the demonstrators had
already violated the law and were technically already under arrest. In
other words, the warnings were not only unnecessary, but would have
proven to be completely counterproductive to the task at hand.
After considering the totality of the circumstances of
this incident, it appears that the lack of warnings was based on the
assumption that the demonstrators had already been warned prior to entering the park, and that the park
was merely used as a holding area for affecting the arrests.
TRANSPORTATION
Once prisoners were placed under arrest, they were
flexi-cuffed, in most cases behind their backs, and placed on Metro
buses that were driven to the Institute of Police Science. This review
did not uncover any particular issues with transportation of prisoners,
with the exception of delays in processing, which led to longer periods
in which arrestees were kept on buses. Due to a backlog in prisoner
processing, once brought to the IPS, some groups of arrestees spent
several hours sitting on buses, or waiting outside of the building until
brought in for processing.
DETENTION
Arrestees were transported to the Institute of Police
Science gymnasium for detention and processing. The MPD currently does
not have a permanent processing facility capable of handling hundreds of
arrests. The IPS, along with satellite operations, was set in place in
anticipation of the possibility of hundreds of arrests arising from this
event.
Once prisoners were brought to the IPS, they were
flexi-cuffed strong wrist-to opposite ankle, with one flexi-cuff in
between. The flexi-cuff between the two binding cuffs was placed in
order to extend the area between the wrist and leg approximately.10 to
twelve inches.
Analysis
Complaints arose prior to, and during this review,
alleging that prisoners were improperly restrained. The complainants
described the restraint as "hogtying."4 The interpretation of
the word "hogtying" is subjective, and it maintains a
generally negative connotation. In common vernacular,
"hogtying" is generally viewed as the restraint of legs and
arms together on some type of pole or device. It should be made clear
that this did not occur in this case.
Based on the accounts of several officials with extensive
experience working in Prisoner Control, they must rely on a fairly
simple and easy-to-maintain system which would prevent hundreds of
prisoners from walking around freely in the gymnasium. This was vital
for several reasons. For instance, allowing prisoners to remain
unrestrained could give them opportunity to regroup and stage additional
protests inside of the facility. This would cause enormous delays in
processing time and could subject both prisoners and officers to injury.
More importantly, once arrestees are taken into custody, the MPD becomes
responsible for their safety until they are released.
It should be noted that this restraint technique was
utilized in April of 2000 during the IMF/World Bank protests. During
that weekend, approximately 1197 demonstrators were arrested. Arrestees
were restrained in this same manner in the two main "open-area"
processing facilities -- the Institute of Police Science gymnasium, and DC
General Hospital Building 25. The majority of arrestees were
flexi-cuffed in the same manner in which the prisoners at the IPS were
restrained on September 27, 2002. To date, no complaints have arisen
from the April 2000 arrests with regard to restraint techniques.
The investigation revealed that there were hundreds of
arrestees confined in the gymnasium, with no holding facilities.
Moreover, Police officials in charge of prisoner processing were
concerned about officer safety and the possibility of escapes because of
the large number of prisoners. Captain Cleora Sharkey made the decision
to restrain the prisoners with flexi-cuffs strong wrist to ankle as this
method had been utilized in the past. Inspector Joel Maupin authorized
this method. Both of these police officials indicated that prisoners
were un-restrained to use the restroom, and were subsequently escorted
by officers on a regular basis for such breaks. This decision appears to
be sound, based on the circumstances faced by the officials. The
situation was fluid and rapidly evolving, requiring an immediate
decision.
Additionally, there were apparent computer-related
malfunctions that delayed prisoner processing. Some prisoners may have
been detained for up to 18 hours. These delays were not illegal and were remedied as soon as practicable. A decision to
institute manual backup procedures should have been implemented
immediately, rather than waiting for technicians to trouble-shoot and
repair automated systems. Operational tests should be conducted prior to
major events to ensure that the Prisoner Control server is operating
properly, and scheduled maintenance to information technology systems
should be rescheduled or postponed to avoid negative impacts on
information systems availability.
MPD General Order 502.1 (Transportation of Prisoners)
states in part:
"Members shall not attach handcuffs to leg
restraints in such a fashion that forces the legs and hands to be close
to one another (i.e.-hog-tying), or place a person in a prone position,
lying face down."
The departmental order stipulates that legs and hands
cannot be tied to one another as that is considered "hog
tying." In the case of the actions taken by prisoner processing
personnel at the IPS, it is evident that arrestees' arms and legs were
not tied together, but rather, only one wrist was tied to the opposite
ankle, making them capable of some movement. The purpose of this type of
restraint was to prevent arrestees from walking around, and not to
incapacitate them completely. Photographs and personal experiments by
Force Investigation Team investigators clearly show that this type of
restraint allows for limited movement, and does not meet the criteria
for "hog tying."
Additional Handcuffinq Techniques
The Special Services Command's, IMF Operational Manual
used during the World Bank protests does not include a written policy
for prisoner handcuffing techniques while prisoners are detained at the
IPS. When the IPS is designated as the prisoner processing facility
during mass demonstrations, it is common practice for arrestees to be
flexi-cuffed, strong wrist to their opposite ankle with a flexi-cuff in
between. The middle flexi-cuff was removed when the arrestees were
escorted to the restroom and while they were permitted to stand up and
stretch. Prisoners are handcuffed using this technique because there are
no holding cells to prevent prisoners from escaping or run freely about
the gymnasium.
Force Investigation Team members reviewed the current
practices, and offer the following suggestions as alternatives to the
current technique:
- Utilize the current technique with minor variations.
This technique is the most cost effective and manageable. The only
suggestion is to add another flexi-cuff between the strong hand and
opposite ankle in order to extend the distance between the arm and leg.
This technique would still prevent prisoners from roaming freely in an
open space, but would allow for more room to stretch or move to less
awkward position. However, this method should be illustrated in greater
detal in the Prisoner Control Plan.
- Use a fixed object placed on the
floor between prisoners, who are in turn handcuffed to the fixed object.
- Purchase fenced cages used as temporary holding
cells-in this manner several prisoners can be detained in one holding
cell under the constant watchful eye of officers assigned to the detail.
RECOMMENDATIONS
After careful review of the facts surrounding this case,
several issues arose as areas of concern with regard to MPD practices
that are either lacking in precise policy, or somewhat nebulous and
thereby open to interpretation. It is recommended that the following
issues be considered prior to future large scale events involving the
MPD:
- Reexamine the current command and control structure
utilized during major events to ensure that command officials receive
timely and accurate information from. which to base decisions on during
large-scale events.
- Review the procedures used for
arrests during mass demonstrations and update. the Mass Demonstration
Handbook to reflect the current operational plans and methods that have
been utilized by the department.
- Implement manual backup procedures immediately upon
receiving notification that the Prisoner Control automated booking
programs are, or are about to be, off-line and not available for
service.
In closing, it is concluded that the actions of police
officials during the September 27, 2002, arrests at Persing Park were
made in good faith. However, it is also concluded that police officials
on the scene made procedural errors as it relates to the affecting of
arrests, choice of criminal charges, and manner of arrest documentation.
Further, it is concluded that technical equipment problems and the
failure to implement manual backup booking procedures led to processing
delays, which in turn caused longer than usual periods of detention.
Finally, it is determined that allegations of excessive force are
unfounded and that the restraint techniques utilized by prisoner
processing personnel were reasonable given the circumstances.
Back to top of page
METROPOLITAN POLICE
Office of Professional Responsibility
Civil Rights & Force Investigations Division
51 N Street, Northeast, Suite 400, Washington D.C., 20002
0 202-724-4269
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
TO: Chief of Police
THRU: Executive Assistant Chief of
Police Operational Services
THRU: Assistant Chief of Police
Office of Professional Responsibility
THRU: Director
Civil Rights and Force Investigation Division
SUBJECT: Final Report Relative to Complaints of Alleged
Misconduct Made at the October 24, 2002, Hearing of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Council of the District of Columbia Concerning the IMF/World
Bank Protests
This memorandum serves as the final investigative report
of the Metropolitan Police Department as it relates to complaints of
alleged misconduct made at the October 24, 2002, Hearing of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the District of Columbia
concerning the IMF/World Bank Protests.
BACKGROUND
During the weekend of September 27th through the 29th,
2002, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) held
their annual meetings at their headquarters located in downtown
Washington, D.C. Intelligence gathered prior to the event, coupled with
information disseminated to the media by protest group leaders indicated
that several groups sought to "shut down the city" by way of
blocking major intersections leading into, and around Washington.
On Friday, September 27, 2002, approximately 400
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank protesters that were a part
of a larger group, marched throughout downtown Washington, D.C. and
finally gathered at Pershing Park, located at 15th and Pennsylvania
Avenue, Northwest. Shortly thereafter, the demonstrators were encircled
by members of the Metropolitan and United States Park Police Departments
and were prohibited from exiting the park.
Assistant Chief Peter J. Newsham was responsible for Area
IV of the World Bank/IMF demonstration detail, which encompassed the
Pershing Park. While on the scene at Pershing Park, Assistant Chief
Newsham gave an order to arrest the protestors for "Failure to obey a
police order", based on his personal observations
and discussions with several Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) command
officials on the scene. Specifically, he observed the protestors violate
traffic laws in a dangerous manner, turn over newspaper boxes, and
ignore officers' orders to get out of the street and onto the sidewalks.
The order was given to Metropolitan Police Department
Civil Disturbance Unit mangers to arrest everyone in the park and
transport them to the Institute of Police Science (IPS) for processing.
Metro Buses were used to transport prisoners to the IPS.
Each prisoner was escorted from a transport bus through
the front doors of the IPS. Every prisoner was photographed and
fingerprinted and his or her arrest paperwork was completed. In cases
where no other charges were pending, arrestees could elect to be
released and pay collateral or receive a citation date to appear in
court at a later time. If arrestees had outstanding warrants or other
holding charges, they were transported to court to appear before a
judge.
During detainment at IPS the arrestees sat on floor mats
and were flexi-cuffed,1b strong hand to their opposite ankle with a
flexi-cuff in between their hand and foot. As needed, the prisoners'
flexi-cuffs were removed as they were escorted to use restroom
facilities and to stretch. The length of detainment varied, but in some
cases lasted as long as eighteen (18) hours.
The delay in prisoner processing was due to a temporary
overload and subsequent failure of the Department's Information
Technology systems. Specifically, the digital cameras that were used to
take prisoner photographs functioned slowly because they could not
handle the volume of pictures taken. The video cameras used to monitor
the downtown area during the midnight tour of duty for Saturday,
September 28, 2002, caused an overload to the electronic processing
equipment thereby causing all of the computers used for prisoner
processing to "crash." Moreover, updates to the Criminal
Justice Information System (CJIS) database on Saturday, September 28,
2002, at approximately 3:00 A.M., caused additional delays.
On October 24, 2002, three (3) complainants testified at
the hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the
District of Columbia in which they alleged that they were unlawfully
arrested and detained for an unreasonable period of time. Furthermore,
the individuals testified that they were "hogtied" while
detained by the Metropolitan Police Department.
On November 12, 2002, the complaint was received by the
Office of Professional Responsibility, and assigned to the Civil Rights
and Force Investigations Division, Force Investigation Team for review.
Sergeant James McCoy and Sergeant James McGuire were
assigned as the Civil Rights and Force Investigation Division
Investigators for this incident. The sergeants were tasked with
conducting interviews and collecting information that was used in this
analysis.
Metropolitan Police Department Members Interviewed
In order to further this examination, numerous MPD
members were interviewed about their recollection of the events that
took place in and around Pershing Park on the day in question. Only
those members identified to have specific and relevant information about
the events at the park were interviewed. The following is a summary of
the statements given by each member.
Assistant Chief Peter Newsham
Assistant Chief Peter Newsham is in charge of the Office
of Professional Responsibility. The following is a synopsis of Assistant
Chief Newsham's statement provided to Executive Assistant Chief Michael
Fitzgerald:
Assistant Chief Newsham explained that his assignment
during the IMF/World Bank demonstrations was Zone IV, which included
Pershing Park. Assistant Chief Newsham related that hundreds of
demonstrators were converging from different directions and moving
toward Pershing Park. Assistant Chief Newsham related that he personally
observed demonstrators turning over newspaper boxes and ignoring
officers' orders to get out of the street and onto the sidewalks.
Assistant Chief Newsham was asked if any warnings were
given to the demonstrators prior to the mass arrest at Pershing Park,
and replied that the conduct of the demonstrators was such that they
were clearly violating traffic laws in a dangerous manner. Assistant
Chief Newsham related that some of the demonstrators were warned by
officers along their route to get onto the sidewalk and out of the
street, however the demonstrators ignored the warnings. Assistant Chief
Newsham further explained that it was not practical to give everybody a
warning or to make sure that everyone received a warning at the point
where all of the protesters converged at Pershing Park. Assistant Chief
Newsham related that the demonstrators were arrested for disorderly
conduct and failure to obey officer's orders for violations that
occurred prior to their entering Pershing Park.
Captain Andrew Solberg
Captain Andrew Solberg is an Assistant District Commander
at the Fourth District. The following is a synopsis of Captain Solberg's
statement provided to Sergeants James McCoy and James McGuire:
Captain Solberg stated that he was assigned as the Fourth
District CDU Commander for the IMF/World Bank demonstrations. At
approximately 9:00 A.M., while in charge of the Fourth District CDU
Bicycle Platoon, he lead a group of demonstrators on bicycles from Union
Station, through the downtown area to Pershing Park located at 15th and
Pennsylvania, Avenue. Captain Solberg related that once he arrived at
Pershing Park, he met with Assistant Chief Brian Jordan and Assistant
Chief Peter Newsham. Captain Solberg was then instructed to position his
CDU platoon in such away that it blocked off access to and from the
south and east sides of the park. He was informed that everyone inside
Pershing Park would be arrested.
Captain Solberg was asked if he gave, heard, or had any
knowledge of an order being given to the protestors in the park to
disperse, or that failing to do so would result in arrest. Captain
Solberg replied that he did not. According to Captain Solberg, Assistant
Chief Jordan relayed to him that an order had been given earlier that
morning to a group of people congregating in the iintersection of 14th and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest.
This order was given prior to Captain Solberg's arrival at Pershing
Square at 9:00 A.M.
Lieutenant Jeffery Harold
Lieutenant Jeffery Harold is assigned to the Special
Operations Division. Lieutenant Harold was responsible for monitoring
the activities of the protesters as well as MPD members and provide
assistance and advice as needed. The following is a synopsis of
Lieutenant Harold's statement provided to Sergeants James McCoy and
James McGuire:
Lieutenant Harold was asked about past practices
concerning prisoner restraint techniques. Lieutenant Harold explained
that he had no knowledge of the origin of utilizing the technique of
flexi-cuffing a prisoner's right wrist to their left ankle.
Lieutenant Harold was also asked if he had knowledge of
an order being given to the protesters at Pershing Park to disperse or
be subjected to arrest. Lieutenant Harold stated that he was unaware if
an order was given to the crowd prior to the mass arrests.
United States Park Police Captain Rick Murphy
U.S. Park Police Captain Murphy was interviewed via the
telephone due to his promotion to the rank of major and reassignment to
New York. Captain Murphy explained that he was on the scene at Pershing
Park on the day in question, and witnessed the group of protesters being
contained within the park. Captain Murphy further detailed a
conversation he had with Assistant Chief Newsham in which he in effect
told the chief that he would not arrest the protesters in the park as
their conduct did not meet the criteria for mass arrests.2b
Inspector Joel Maupin
Inspector Joel Maupin is the Deputy Director of the
Institute of Police Science (IPS). Inspector Maupin was the command
official in charge of the prisoner processing facility at the IPS during
the IMF detail. The following is a synopsis of Inspector Maupin's
tape-recorded statement provided to Sergeants James McCoy and James
McGuire:
When asked about the prisoner processing procedures at
the IPS, Inspector Maupin discussed the processing, detainment, release
and/or transport to court. The inspector explained that each prisoner
was escorted from a transport bus through the front doors of the IPS.
Each prisoner was photographed, fingerprinted, and his or her arrest
paperwork was completed. If there were no other charges pending,
arrestees could elect to be released and either pay a collateral or
receive a citation to appear in court on a future date. If arrestees had
outstanding warrants or other holding charges, they were transported to
court.
While detained at IPS, the arrestees were
flexi-cuffed-strong hand to their opposite ankle -- with a flexi-cuff in
between their hand and foot. Additionally, when asked about prisoners
being handcuffed during processing, he stated that the prisoner's
flexi-cuffs were removed during the processing procedures and were
re-flexi-cuffed; one hand to the opposite leg in front of their body once the processing was complete. As needed, the
prisoners' flexi-cuffs were removed as they were escorted to use
restroom facilities and to periodically stretch.
Captain Cleora Sharkey
Captain Cleora Sharkey is the Operations Commander at the
Major Narcotics Branch. The following is a synopsis of Captain Sharkey's
statement provided to Sergeants James McCoy and James McGuire:
Captain Sharkey related that she was one of the
operations officials in charge of the prisoner processing facility.
Captain Sharkey stated that she prepared the operational plan and
scheduled the personnel for the IMF detail. Captain Sharkey was asked if
a briefing was given to the officials detailed to the IPS for prisoner
processing. She replied that a briefing was given to discuss the
operational plan.
When asked about the detainment procedures used while the
arrestees were inside the gymnasium portion of the Institute of Police
Science, Captain Sharkey explained that the arrestees were flexi-cuffed,
strong hand to their opposite ankle with a flexi-cuff in between. Captain
Sharkey related that the middle flexi-cuff was removed when the
arrestees were escorted to the restroom. She further stated that it was
necessary to use this technique to handcuff prisoners because there was
no holding facility and this measure was taken so that prisoners could
not run around freely. Additionally, she stated that there was no
written policy in the IMF/World Bank operational manual for handcuffing
procedures at the processing facility.
Captain Sharkey was asked if there were any Information
Technology (IT) problems at the processing facility. She related that
there was a delay because the digital cameras could not handle the
volume of prisoner photos taken. During the midnight tour of duty for
the next day, video cameras used to monitor the downtown area caused an
overload to the electronic processing equipment and all of the computers
used for processing "crashed." Additionally, due to updates on
September 28, at approximately 3:00 A.M. to the CJIS database, major
delays to prisoner processing occurred.
Civilian Witnesses
The following witnesses testified at the October 24th,
2002 Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the
District of Columbia concerning the IMF/World Bank Protests. Below is a
brief summary of their testimony. Extensive interviews were not
conducted with these individuals due to pending litigation3b.
Statement of Mr. Joseph Mayer
Mr. Mayer stated that he was arrested in Pershing Square
in relation to the IMF/World Bank protests. The complainant reported
that he went to Pershing Square on Pennsylvania Avenue along with his
daughter. He claims that the police came into the park and did not allow
anyone to leave.
Statement of Ms. Julie Abbate
Ms. Abbate stated that she was arrested in Pershing
Square in relation to the IMF/World Bank protests. Ms. Abate further
testified that she went to Pershing Square out of curiosity and was not
allowed to leave the park after the police moved in.
Statement of Mr. Michael Eichler
Mr. Eichler testified that he was arrested in Pershing
Square in relation to the IMF/World Bank protests. He further reported
that he arrived at the park on a bicycle and that once he entered the
park, he was denied the opportunity to leave by the police. He also
testified that at no point during his detainment in the park was he
ordered to leave the area.
All three complainants further claimed that they were
flexi-cuffed behind their back, placed on a Metro bus, and transported
to a detention facility.
Video and Photographs
Members assigned to the prisoner processing detail at the
IPS took still digital photographs of the detention area in the
gymnasium. The photos depict the detainment area along with the
handcuffed prisoners. The photos further depict groups of prisoners
flexi-cuffed-wrist to opposite ankle-sitting on blue mats on the
gymnasium floor. Some prisoners are sitting upright and talking to other
prisoners nearby. Other prisoners are seen laying down sleeping (photos
attached).
Videotapes were obtained that were taken by MPD personnel
assigned to record the demonstrations. The video segments depicting the
events at Pershing Park pick up after all of the protesters were lead
into the park. The video further shows MPD and U.S. Park Police (both on
foot and mounted) surrounding a large group of protesters. Finally, the
video depicts MPD officers entering the cordoned-off area, physically
grabbing hold of individual protesters, and placing them under arrest.
There is no video of the detention facility at the IPS.
Policy Review
The Civil Rights and Force Investigation Division, Force
Investigation Team (FIT) conducted a policy review of the facts
surrounding the department's arrest, transportation, and detention
procedures used during the IMF/World Bank protests. Specifically,
investigators and managers assessed the protocols used by police
commanders as they relate to arrests and prisoner processing during this
incident. Moreover, decisions made by MPD command officials during the
events at Pershing Park were evaluated. FIT members have reviewed the
written procedures enumerated in the operational manual that were
created and implemented by the Special Services Command during the
IMF/World Bank demonstrations. The following is a precise dissection of
each category identified in this report as either a policy violation or
one that is ambiguously written, thereby leaving certain aspects open to
individual interpretation. Recommendations to remedy any noted
deficiencies are presented immediately following this review.
ARREST
On the day in question, there were numerous protest
groups that later converged into Pershing Park. For instance, Fourth
District CDU bicycle squads escorted a group of bicyclists from Union
Station to the park. Based on interviews with Captain Andrew Solberg-the
command official that oversaw the shepherding of the bicyclists toward
the park-no warnings were given to the riders that they might be
subjected to arrest. Although several courses of action were
contemplated before the protesters set off from Union Station and onto
the streets, none were implemented and the riders were allowed to
proceed.4b Moreover, they were escorted to Pershing Park and directed to
enter the area blocked off by police.
Based on the testimony of the complainants in this case,
it is probablethat there were numerous individuals in the park that were not part of
any groups headed toward the park under continuous observation by
police. In other words, there is a strong possibility that persons were
already in the park and had not committed any illegal acts prior to
arrival of police units who proceeded to block off the area and prevent
anyone from leaving. There is no evidence to support the claim that
every person in the park had been involved in an unlawful advancement
toward the park -- either on foot or on bicycle.
With regard to arrests, the following specific questions
were raised in order to further this review:
Why were the protesters in Pershing Park arrested?
The order to arrest the protesters in the park was given
by Assistant Chief Peter Newsham. Based on his account of events that
lead up to the order to arrest, groups of protesters were moving through
the streets and advancing toward the park and were observed doing the
following5b:
- Assistant Chief Newsham personally
observed a large group marching in the street and overturning newspaper
stands.
- It was relayed to Assistant Chief
Newsham that several protesters broke a bank window a few blocks away
and were becoming increasingly violent.
- It was relayed to Assistant Chief
Newsham that various protesters had illegally marched in the street and
were ordered innumerable times to get back onto the sidewalk.
Based on Assistant Chief Newsham's explanation, the
protesters in Pershing Park had committed violations before entering the
park. Groups of protesters were marching in the street and were
supposedly warned by officers to get back on the sidewalk. Assistant
Chief Newsham essentially used the park as a roadblock of
sorts, in which protesters that had already broken the law were stopped
and arrested.
Analyses:
The decision to arrest everyone in Pershing Park was not
sound. The demonstrators that violated specific laws should have been
separated or stopped at the time the violations were observed and
arrested. Pershing Park was used as the holding area until the arrests
could be affected. It is more than probable that numerous persons inside
of the park had arrived there lawfully with no intent to commit any
violations of the law. Several clusters of demonstrators that committed
separate violations were all combined into one large group in the park
and charged with Failure to Obey a Police Officer. To further support
this assumption, at leastfive members of the Press were released on the
Detention Journal later that afternoon, indicating an improper arrest.
Furthermore, every case in which demonstrators did not elect to forfeit
and had his or her case presented to the Office of the Corporation
Counsel was dismissed by that office.6b
It is a much easier task employing hindsight and
evaluating the decisions made by command officials months later, than
being in a position responsible for making those decisions in the field.
Furthermore, the decision must be evaluated in a specific context and
not in a vacuum. Specifically, protesters had threatened to "shut
down the city" on numerous occasions both to police and the media.
The MPD was tasked with not only safeguarding life and property in the
immediate area of the demonstrations, but also for maintaining clear and
safe passages into and throughout the city due to heightened terrorism
alerts.
It is clear that the judgment to arrest the protesters in
the park was made in good faith, and following an assessment of all of
the facts and circumstances. However, it cannot be established that all
of those persons in the park were part of any particular group engaged
in unlawful behavior. The fact that command officials and arresting
members could not make a distinction between those that were engaged in
unlawful behavior and those that were not, tainted those arrests that
were timely and proper.
Were the charges placed on the Pershing Park
demonstrators correct?
All of the demonstrators in the park were charged with
Failure to Obey an Officer. This is a District of Columbia Traffic
Regulation law7b utilized primarily for purposes of ensuring that
officers tasked with directing traffic have the authority to direct
motorists and pedestrians in a proper and safe manner. The field arrest
forms from Pershing Park indicate that each arresting officer personally
attested to the fact that he or she saw the protester depicted in the
form engaging in unlawful activity, and individually gave a warning to
cease such activity.
Analyses
As previously stated, each arrest form from Pershing Park
indicates that a specific officer saw the listed demonstrator engaging
in unlawful activity-in this case, walking in the street-and
subsequently issued an order to that particular demonstrator to cease
that activity by returning to the sidewalk. Further review of this
matter exposed that this was in fact not the case-none of the officers
could actually testify that the defendant described in the field arrest
form was given a warning by him or her. In other words, officers could
not be accurately linked to the defendant pictured and arrested. It is
likely that several officers along the impromptu parade route shouted at
demonstrators to return to the sidewalk, but none could be truly linked
to a specific demonstrator.
It appears that this was an improper charge for this
particular event, and was somewhat of a departure from previous mass
demonstration arrest charges. The Failure to Obey an Officer charge
could have held up to judicial scrutiny if every arresting officer was
able to conclusively substantiate each of his or her arrests.
A more appropriate charge would have been Parading
Without a Permit for the protesters marching in the street, and
Incommoding or Disorderly Conduct for those engaged in that specific
behavior a few blocks away. In this manner, officers tasked with
arresting protesters could more easily explain the goings-on they
observed as long as command officials on the scene of the mass arrests
ensured that each field arrest form properly illustrated that the listed
officer observed the listed defendant as part of a group engaged in
whatever illegal activity. It is important to stress the point that each
arresting officer, by current MPD mass arrest standards, can arrest 15
demonstrators at a time, but must be able to testify that he or she saw
the defendant engaged in illegal activity as part of a group. In other
words, each officer will not necessarily be able to identify each and
every defendant in his cluster of arrestees, but will be able to testify
that the defendant was part of a group of protesters that he or she
observed engaged in illegal activity. Moreover, the field arrest form
and photograph of the defendant will further strengthen this assertion.
In the Pershing Park case, the arrest paperwork could not support the
claim that each officer personally warned each of the defendants listed
in the form.
Why were warnings to disperse not given in Pershing Park?
In the preliminary stages of this review, much of the
focus surrounded around the question: why were the protesters in the
park not warned or given an opportunity to leave?
According to MPD's Mass Demonstration Handbook, at least
two documented warnings prior to arrest must be made. This has been the
practice in previous mass arrest situations -- a Civil Disturbance Unit
command official would normally issue the warnings by utilizing a
bullhorn. In this manner, the demonstrators would be informed as to
which law they were violating, and that they would be subjected to
arrest should they fail to disperse. A key component of the strategy is
enabling the demonstrators to leave after the initial warnings are
given.
The examination of the Pershing Park arrests has
conclusively revealed that no warnings were given to the demonstrators
in the park. A review of the videotape, which captured the arrests at
the park does not reveal any warnings given. Moreover, Assistant Chief
Newsham, Captain Solberg, Park Police Captain Murphy, and numerous other
interviewed individuals stated that they heard no warnings to disperse
given by police.
Analyses
Assistant Chief Peter Newsham, the MPD command official
in charge of the zone encompassing Pershing Park, stated that no
warnings were given to the demonstrators because they had essentially
been warned before entering the park. According to Chief Newsham, prior
to arriving in the park, the protesters had committed violations while
en route to the park, and had been warned countless times by officers to
disperse, to get back on the sidewalk, and to cease their disorderly
doings.
There is no conclusive evidence to support the fact that
demonstrators were warned before entering the park. However, once
carefully examined, the relevancy of whether warnings were given in the
park came into question. Chief Newsham explained that warnings were not
given, nor were any required because in his mind, the demonstrators had
already violated the law and were technically already under arrest. In
other words, the warnings were not only unnecessary, but would have
proven to be completely counterproductive to the task at hand.
The troubling aspect of the lack of warnings only arises
when supposed non-involved demonstrators were arrested in the park, and
claim that they had no idea they could not leave until it was too late.
As previously recounted in this report, it is probable that there were
numerous persons inside the park that had arrived there legally, and
were not engaged in any type of disorder. The lack of warning carries a
greater significance to that particular group of people because they were not warned about the possibility
of being arrested, nor were they engaged in any law violating conduct.
After considering the totality of the circumstances of
this incident, it appears that warnings were not necessary based on the
assumption that the demonstrators had already been warned prior to
entering the park, and that the park was merely used as a holding area
for arrests.
TRANSPORTATION
Once prisoners were placed under arrest, they were
flexi-cuffed in most cases behind their backs and placed on Metro buses
that were driven to the Institute of Police Science. This review did not
uncover any particular issues with transportation of prisoners. From all
accounts, it appears to have been conducted in an orderly and efficient
manner. One specific allegation of police misconduct arose during the
transportation phase while prisoners were on the bus awaiting transfer
to the IPS for processing. Several arrestees complained of inappropriate
remarks by an officer assigned to guard the bus and prisoners. This
complaint was not investigated by the Civil Rights and Force
Investigation Division, but was forwarded to the Special Services
Command for review. There were no other complaints brought forth, or
findings of instances of use-of-force or other misconduct during
prisoner transportation.
DETENTION
Arrestees were transported to the Institute of Police
Science gymnasium for detention and processing. The MPD currently does
not have a permanent processing facility capable of handling hundreds of
arrests. The IPS, along with satellite operations, was set in place in
anticipation of several thousand arrests arising from this event.
Once prisoners were brought to the IPS, they were
flexi-cuffed strong wrist-to opposite ankle, with one flexi-cuff in
between. The flexi cuff between the two binding cuffs was placed in
order to extend the area between the wrist and leg approximately 10 to
twelve inches.
Analyses
Numerous complaints arose prior to, and during this
review, alleging that prisoners were improperly restrained. The
complainants described the restraint as "hogtying"8b. The
interpretation of the word "hogtying" is subjective, and it
maintains a generally negative connotation. In common vernacular,
"hogtying" is generally viewed as the restraint of legs and
arms together on some type of pole or device. It should be made clear
that this did not occur in this case. Based on the accounts of numerous
officials in charge of prisoner processing, they had to come up with a
fairly easy to maintain system which would prevent hundreds of prisoners
from walking around freely in the gymnasium. This was vital for several
reasons. For instance, allowing hundreds of prisoners to essentially
roam freely could give them ample opportunity to regroup and stage
additional protests inside of the facility. This would cause enormous
delays in processing time and could subject both prisoners and officers
to injury. More importantly, once arrestees are taken into custody, the
MPD becomes responsible for their safety until they are released.
According to prisoner processing officials, there have been instances in
past mass arrests in which arrestees were free to roam the processing
areas unrestrained, and numerous complaints of sexual misconduct arose.
The policy review revealed that there were no
inappropriate instances of handcuffing by members of the Metropolitan
Police Department. The prisoners were restrained in a manner that was
practical, safe, and appropriate while they were detained at the IPS.
The investigation revealed that there were hundreds of
arrestees confined in the gymnasium, with no holding facilities.
Moreover, Police officials in charge of prisoner processing were
concerned about officer safety and the possibility of escapes because of
the large number of prisoners. It appears that a decision was made by
Captain Cleora Sharkey to restrain the prisoners with flexi-cuffs strong
arm to ankle. Inspector Joel Maupin apparently authorized this method.
Both of these police officials indicated that prisoners were
un-restrained to use the restroom, and were subsequently escorted by
officers on a regular basis for such breaks.
This decision appears to be sound, based on the
circumstances faced by the officials. The situation was fluid and
rapidly evolving, requiring an immediate action. However, it is
recommended that an operational plan be written to formally
institutionalize future mass detentions at IPS (or any other location)
with more of an emphasis on handcuffing techniques.
Additionally, there were apparent computer-related
malfunctions that delayed prisoner processing. Some prisoners may have
been detained for up to 18 hours. These delays were not illegal, and
were remedied as soon as practicable. The delays were not within the
ability of the officials at IPS to correct. This review assessed no
fault to any particular person with regard to the delays; however,
operational tests should be conducted prior to major events to ensure
that any Information Technology systems do not overload.
Additional Handcuffing Techniques
The Special Services Command's, IMF Operational Manual
used during the World Bank protests does not include a written policy
for prisoner handcuffing techniques while prisoners are detained at the
IPS. When the IPS is designated as the prisoner processing facility
during mass demonstrations, it is common practice for arrestees to be
flexi-cuffed, strong hand to their opposite ankle with a flexi-cuff in
between. The middle flexi-cuff was removed when the arrestees were
escorted to the restroom and while they were permitted to stand up and
stretch. Prisoners are handcuffed using this technique because there are
no holding cells to prevent prisoners from escaping or run freely about
the gymnasium.
Force Investigation Team members reviewed the current
practices, and offer the following suggestions as alternatives to the
current technique:
- Utilize the current technique with
minor variations. This technique is the most cost effective and
manageable. The only suggestion is to add another flexi-cuff between the
strong hand and opposite ankle in order to extend the distance between
the arm and leg. This technique would still prevent prisoners from
roaming freely in an open space, but would allow for more room to
stretch or move to less awkward position.
- Use a device similar to a sitting
dragon in which a fixed object is placed on the floor between prisoners,
which are in turn handcuffed to the fixed object.
- Purchase fenced cages used as
temporary holding cells-in this manner several prisoners can be detained
in one holding cell under the constant watchful eye of officers assigned
to the detail.
RECOMMENDATIONS
After careful review of the facts surrounding this case,
several issues arose as areas of concern with regard to MPD practices
that are either lacking in precise policy, or somewhat nebulous thereby
open to interpretation. It is recommended that the following issues be
considered prior to future large scale events involving the MPD:
- All Police Executives need to be
C.D.U. trained or retrained-Currently, most commanders and assistant
chiefs are placed in charge of quadrants in which mass arrests are
likely to take place. Numerous command officials do not possess the
experience in handling complex civil disturbance events. Moreover, the
majority of officers graduating from the Institute of Police Science
undergo a weeklong training curriculum in civil disturbance. In some
cases, this leads to an undesirable, even detrimental situation in which
many officers and supervisors possess more knowledge and training than
the official in command.
- Revise the procedures used during
mass demonstrations for arrest. The MPD has not been faced with the
inevitability of arresting thousands of unruly protesters in over three
decades. The majority of mass arrests conducted by this agency
surrounded the perennial Right to Life activists. Those arrests had
become a ritual of sorts for the department, and were traditionally
coordinated by the Special Operations Division. The demonstrators themselves were almost always passive, and
carried their message by blocking abortion clinics and shouting warnings
at passers by.
In April of 2000, during the first International Monetary
Fund/World Bank meetings, the MPD was faced with arresting hundreds,
even thousands of unruly protesters on the heels of the Seattle debacle.
It now appears that many non-involved witnesses and passers-by were
corralled along with hundreds of actual protestors and arrested in that
event. The agency has to carefully examine the logistics, but more
importantly, the likely ramifications of placing hundreds of protesters
and bystanders under arrest. The is no doubt that the MPD has to balance
the protection of life, property, equal rights, etc. against making such
arrests, however, it must carefully consider its actions from an
inescapable litigious standpoint
A meeting was recently held by the Office of the General
Counsel and attended by representatives from the Office of the
Corporation Counsel, Civil Rights and Force Investigation Division, and
Special Services Command. This was an important first step in analyzing
current practices with a view toward reducing liability to the
department while maintaining order.
Captain Matthew Klein
Commanding Officer
Force
Investigation Team
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GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT
P.O. Box 1606, Washington, D.C. 20013-1606
MEMORANDUM
TO: The Honorable Anthony A. Williams
Mayor, District of Columbia
FROM: Charles H. Ramsey
Chief of Police
DATE: March 13, 2003
SUBJECT: Final Decisions on Recommendations Following
Review of Actions Taken by Members of the Metropolitan Police Department
During the Fall 2002 IMF/World Bank Protests
The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the
final decisions I have made as a result of the investigation conducted
into allegations of police misconduct made during the October 24, 2002,
hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the District
of Columbia. As previously reported to you, I reviewed the January 25,
2003 report prepared by Civil Rights& Force Investigations Division
of the Office of Professional Responsibility and concurred with the
findings. The investigation had not revealed any inappropriate instances
of police use-of-force or application of prisoner restraints. The
investigation had determined, however, that the charge placed against
persons arrested in Pershing Park was not appropriate. These points are
clarified more fully below.
The report made three major recommendations:
- Reexamine the current command and control structure
utilized during major events to ensure that command officials receive
timely and accurate information from which to base decisions on during
large-scale events.
- Review the procedures used for arrests during mass
demonstrations and update the Mass Demonstration Handbook to reflect the
current operational plans and methods that have been utilized by the
department.
- Implement manual backup procedures immediately upon
receiving notification that the Prisoner Control automated booking
programs are, or are about to be, off-line and not available for
service.
Upon further review, and after consultation with members
of my executive staff, I have determined that our existing policies for
handling mass demonstrations are adequate. The policies concerning mass arrests are .contained in the
MPD Handbook for the Management of Mass Demonstrations (January 1996).
These policies address crowd management techniques, including dispersal
(which incorporates issuance of at least 2 warnings), arrest and
prisoner processing. However, since the handbook was last published in
1996, I have directed that it be revised and updated to include any
changes that have occurred.
I have approved the recommendation that manual back-up
procedures be implemented automatically when the automated booking
system is unavailable. Further, I have directed that the procedures for
processing prisoners be reviewed and updated as needed to reflect our
current technologies and operations. This alone should insure against
processing delays as experienced this past September.
I have also concluded that the best method to secure
prisoners during mass arrests is to continue use of the plastic
"Flexi-Cuffs", although MPD officers at processing and
detention sites will add a sufficient number of cuffs to ensure that the
prisoners can sit in comfort while awaiting processing. MPD General
Order 502.1 (Transportation of Prisoners), as well as any other
applicable manuals and/or handbooks, will be amended to mandate that the
use of "Flexi-Cuffs" as recommended in the report does not
amount to "hog tying", and that the prohibition on
"hogtying" is intended to ensure that prisoners are not
restrained in such a way that may cause or contribute to positional
asphyxia.
In addition, I have directed that the policies set forth
in the Mass Demonstration Handbook be adhered to in the future. To
ensure that this is clear, all individual operational plans for specific
events in the future will incorporate the Mass Demonstration Handbook,
and the command staff will now be required to review procedures with
appropriate subordinates who will be supporting the event. Such actions
will ensure that the procedural errors that occurred. during the
September 27, 2002 arrests at Pershing Park are not repeated.
Finally, I have determined that since the actions of the
police officials involved in making the decisions to arrest at Pershing
Park under rapidly evolving circumstances were made in good faith, there
is no need to subject them to disciplinary action at the adverse action
level. As you are aware, police officers frequently make arrests based
on facts observed by them or made known to them. In some instances the
charges are modified or dropped depending on what information is
obtained subsequently. In the aftermath of the arrests made at Pershing
Park we learned that although many of the persons arrested for
"failure to obey" had in fact. engaged in illegal conduct,
there was not a sufficient basis to link the particular suspect to
warnings issued along the route of the march. Thus, the officers
assigned to handle the arrestees under our mass arrest procedures were
not able to assert with particularity that they had knowledge of the
warning and that the individual arrestee had received the warning. This
failure will not occur again, as we have taken steps to ensure warnings
are given and adequate time provided to leave the area for those wishing
to avoid arrest.
I have counseled each member of the command staff to
ensure that these procedural errors are not repeated in future
large-scale events where mass arrests may occur. I believe that under
the circumstances in which the decision to arrest was made, this is a
sufficient level of corrective action.
These approved recommendations Will be implemented prior
to the IMF/World Bank meetings April 2003.
As you know, I share your deep concern about protecting
the rights of individuals to express their opinions, petition their
government, and demonstrate about their causes in the Nation's Capital.
That protection must be balanced against ensuring the public's safety.
Just as protestors constantly change their techniques and strategies, so
must the Metropolitan Police Department. In hindsight, we may question
the judgments made by officials on the scene, but we must also recognize
that they made their decisions in a very different context than we are
now making our evaluation of their performance. The United States
Supreme Court recognized this in the context of examining the
reasonableness of the use of force when it stated in Graham v. Connor,
that "[t]he reasonableness of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight ... The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that the police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." It is
with this in mind that I determined counseling was the best course to
take in addressing the decisions made at Pershing Park.
Thank you for you continuing support of this Department
and our efforts to secure the appropriate balance between safety and
liberty in the District of Columbia.
CC: John A. Koskinen
City Administrator
Margret Nedelkoff Kellems, Esq.
Deputy Mayor
Public Safety and Justice
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1. The Flexi-Cuffs consisted of three "loops"-one
around the wrist of the strong hand, another around the opposite ankle, and an additional cuff between the two
thereby extending the space between the arm and opposite leg.
2. NOTE: ACLU Attorney Arthur Spitzer refused to provide MPD with the address or
contact information of these complainants. He advised that all police contacts with
these complainants have to be made through him.
3. District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title 18,
Chapter 20, Section 2000:2: No person shall fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, police cadet,
or civilian crossing guard invested by law with authority to direct,
control, or regulate traffic.
4. Webster's Dictionary defines hogtying as: 1. to tie the
four feet or the hands and feet of 2 [colloq.] to make incapable of
effective action.
1b. The Flexi-Cuffs consisted of three "loops"
-- one
around the wrist of the strong hand, another around the opposite ankle,
and an additional cuff between the two thereby extending the space
between the arm and opposite leg.
2b. Captain Murphy indicated that the protesters' actions
in the park did not meet the criteria for mass arrest based on U.S Park
Police protocols. He advised that in similar situations, the protesters
would first be warned to disperse. Captain Murphy refused to make
arrests for any violations that may have occurred in the park only.
3b. NOTE: ACLU Attorney Arthur Spitzer refused to provide
MPD with the address or contact information of these complainants. He
advised that all police contacts with these complainants have to be made
through him.
4b. One avenue explored was the inspection of all bicycle
registrations and subsequent impoundment of any unregistered equipment.
5b. Note: Assistant Chief Newsham explained that he
personally observed some of the violations himself while other
violations were observed by other members of the department at separate
locations and relayed the information to him at a later time.
6b. Each of these cases was dismissed because none of the
officers could properly attest to which demonstrator was warned-none of
the arresting officers could provide testimony to support the claim of
failure to obey.
7b. District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title, 18,
Chapter 20, Section 2000.2: No person shall fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, police cadet,
or civilian crossing guard invested by law with authority to direct,
control, or regulate traffic.
8b. Webster's Dictionary defines hogtying as: 1. to tie the
four feet or the hands and feet of 2 [colloq.] to make incapable of
effective action.
Back to top of page
Patterson Criticizes Mayor for Inaction on Rights Violations
Washington D.C. - Feb. 26, 2003 - Council Judiciary
Committee Chair Kathy Patterson today described the findings of an
internal review of Metropolitan Police Department actions during the
September 27-29, 2002, IMF-World Bank protests, and charged Mayor
Anthony Williams with violating the public trust in failing to act on
the report's conclusions.
Patterson said the report acknowledged that individuals
were arrested without provocation and detained for excessive lengths of
time.
"Under Mayor Williams' leadership, the District
government violated the rights of hundreds of District residents and
visitors, and may have compromised the future effectiveness of dozens of
police officers," Patterson said.
"Not only were arrests preemptive and wrongful, not
only was the detention inhumane, but officers in the field were directed
to sign arrest forms that were inaccurate on their face," she said.
"The Metropolitan Police Department, under Mayor Tony Williams, stands compromised by their own
actions last fall and by the Mayor's inaction since that time."
Over the weekend of September 27-29, District police
arrested close to 400 persons at Pershing Park at 15th Street and
Pennsylvania Avenue, charging them with "failure to obey a police
order." Many were detained in excess of 24 hours, with wrists bound
to ankles so they could not straighten up. All charges were ultimately
dropped. After three of those arrested testified about their experiences
before the Judiciary Committee in October, Patterson asked Mayor
Williams to investigate the actions and take steps to see that similar
violations do not reoccur.
"Mayor Williams assured me, in writing, that there
would be an investigation and action taken within 10 days,"
Patterson said. "He's missed his deadlines; he's taken no
action." The police department's Office of Professional
Responsibility conducted an internal investigation, and forwarded the
report of that investigation to Mayor Williams on January 25. Patterson
received a confidential copy of the report on January 28.
In testimony before the Judiciary Committee on February
25, MPD Chief Charles Ramsey said he is considering policy and
procedural changes in the wake of the September mass arrests, including
the type of restraints and arrest forms used and communication protocols
in the field. He said in the future the Department will move immediately
to a manual processing if computer systems cause delays. He disagreed
with Patterson's suggestion that arresting officers were directed to
make false statements in signing the field arrest forms.
Patterson summarized the confidential report's
conclusions as follows:
- Police arrested bystanders who had
not participated in the demonstrations.
- Before the arrests, police refused to permit those
who wanted to leave Pershing Park to do so.
- Those arrested were charged with
"failure to obey a police order," but witnesses including law
enforcement officials did not hear any orders being given to those who
were subsequently arrested.
- Arresting officers signed field
arrest forms affirming that, in each case, they saw the person arrested
engaged in unlawful activity. In fact, not a single arresting officer
gave or observed a police warning.
- Following arrest and transport to
the police academy, those arrested were held up to an additional 18
hours due to computer-caused processing delays. The department failed to
implement a manual backup system.
- Detainees were restrained with
plastic "flexicuffs" with one wrist tethered to the opposite
ankle so that individuals could not stand up or lie prone. The report
claims that this does not constitute "hogtying" although the
department's own definition, which prohibits the practice, states that
hogtying is a restraint "that forces the legs and hands to be close
to one another."
- There were procedural errors in the
arrests, the choice of charges, and the manner of arrest documentation.
"While there were serious omissions of information,
the report, nonetheless, substantiates violations and cries out for
clear executive direction," Patterson said. "At the very
minimum, Mayor Williams should have publicly pledged that the
Metropolitan Police Department will, itself, respect the Constitution,
obey District law, and refrain from violating its own general
orders."
In a November 6, 2002, letter to Ramsey instructing him
to investigate the Council testimony, Mayor Williams wrote,
"individual acts of misconduct will not be tolerated... .it is imperative that we thoroughly look
into these serious charges."
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