Home
Bibliography
Calendar
Columns
Dorothy Brizill
Bonnie Cain
Jim Dougherty
Gary Imhoff
Phil Mendelson
Mark David Richards
Sandra Seegars
DCPSWatch
DCWatch
Archives
Council Period 12
Council Period 13
Council Period 14
Election 1998
Election 2000
Election 2002
Elections
Election
2004
Election 2006
Government and People
ANC's
Anacostia Waterfront Corporation
Auditor
Boards and Com
BusRegRefCom
Campaign Finance
Chief Financial Officer
Chief Management Officer
City Council
Congress
Control Board
Corporation Counsel
Courts
DC2000
DC Agenda
Elections and Ethics
Fire Department
FOI Officers
Inspector General
Health
Housing and Community Dev.
Human Services
Legislation
Mayor's Office
Mental Health
Motor Vehicles
Neighborhood Action
National
Capital Revitalization Corp.
Planning and Econ. Dev.
Planning, Office of
Police Department
Property Management
Public Advocate
Public Libraries
Public Schools
Public Service Commission
Public Works
Regional Mobility Panel
Sports and Entertainment Com.
Taxi Commission
Telephone Directory
University of DC
Water and Sewer Administration
Youth Rehabilitation Services
Zoning Commission
Issues in DC Politics
Budget issues
DC Flag
DC General, PBC
Gun issues
Health issues
Housing initiatives
Mayor’s mansion
Public Benefit Corporation
Regional Mobility
Reservation 13
Tax Rev Comm
Term limits repeal
Voting rights, statehood
Williams’s Fundraising Scandals
Links
Organizations
Appleseed Center
Cardozo Shaw Neigh.Assoc.
Committee of 100
Fed of Citizens Assocs
League of Women Voters
Parents United
Shaw Coalition
Photos
Search
What Is DCWatch?
themail
archives
|
A D.C. BILL OF RIGHTS:
A PLEA FOR CONSENSUS
By Timothy Cooper
Against a backdrop of considerable consternation over the loss of DC
voting rights cases in the US Supreme Court, a quiet chaos has spread
through the rank and file of the DC democracy movement as it endeavors to
develop new winnable strategies to obtain true political rights for
Washingtonians. Yet if there is to be any realistic hope of ever winning
representation in Congress — a political imperative sought by DC
residents and leaders for 200 years — the strategic fissures within the
movement that have historically worked at cross-purposes must first be
reconciled.
To reach critical mass in the local campaign for genuine political
equality, a grand consensus must first be developed. This will help the
city avoid the kind of dissension and resistance within the movement that
inevitably dilutes its reach and power. The latest round of voting rights
lawsuits — which stood in marked conflict with each other every step of
the way-- represents the sharp ideological divisions that have
historically split the city into various camps: those seeking strictly
voting representation in Congress and those seeking either statehood or DC
retrocession to Maryland.
But a city divided against itself cannot hope to unite a nation behind
its campaign for equal rights. The District’s population is only
two-tenths of 1% of that of the entire country’s, yet the city is
proposing to ignite a national campaign to win 5% of all Congressional
seats. Any realistic campaign to win the hearts and minds of the American
public requires that the District stand wholly unified in the face of such
sizeable odds.
Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) once said of the campaign for Alaskan
statehood, "Just imagine this: It’s the turn of the century, [the]
territory [is] unorganized, with 64,000 residents, connected only by boat
to the contiguous states, and by 1958 had only 226,000 residents, [yet]
they succeeded in becoming a full partner in the greatest nation in the
world. We did that because we were, are, and must continue to be a
team."
The District has no such team; it has only a loose confederacy of
politically warring tribes, which seek to undermine each other at every
possible opportunity. It is a recipe for continued ineffectiveness, when
winning power is the name of the game. However, until an acceptable
compromise is struck between the opposing forces, which also has the full
faith and backing of the business community, grassroots, political
leaders, and Washington’s elite, the same ideological strategies are
likely to divide the city at the expense of winning full democracy.
Is it possible to reach consensus citywide? Whether or not it can, the
recent presidential victory of George W. Bush provides the city ample time
to find out before it gears up to mount its next major offensive. Perhaps
a DC Democracy Congress should be called to hash it out. In any event, any
strategic decision should be ratified by 70% of District voters across all
wards, in order to demonstrate citywide solidarity. Consensus is
everything — if we want to win.
Remedies of Choice.
As everyone knows, not all remedies are the same. Various notions of
political equality are not necessarily the equivalent of constitutional
parity. Moreover, some remedies may be more politically difficult to
attain than others. Whatever the remedy, three threshold questions must
first be answered by leaders and District residents:
- Do DC residents actually want equal constitutional rights?
- If so, do they insist on obtaining those rights while living in the
District, or are they willing to be included in the state of Maryland?
and
- Are DC residents willing to settle for something less than equal
rights, like representation in the House of Representatives only, or
full representation in the House and the Senate, with control over the
District’s local affairs continuing under the ultimate authority of
Congress?
A review of the pros and cons of traditional remedies under
consideration is useful.
- Statehood: Pro: It provides absolute and permanent political
equality for DC residents, giving DC residents full Congressional
representation as well as complete control over its local affairs
comparable to other states. Con: A statehood bill was defeated in 1993
by a 277-153 margin. 41% of all Democrats in Congress voted against
it, notwithstanding the fact that DC statehood was endorsed in the
Democratic Party platform. In addition, statehood has never garnered
citywide support. While a Washington Post February 2000 poll
found that 58% of all DC residents support DC statehood — up from
46% in 1997 — only 45% of whites in Washington support it, compared
to 63% of African-Americans. Most importantly, however, is the fact
that statehood is not possible until the District can retain and pay
for all its state functions, specifically its prison system and
courts. This crucial consideration has been recognized by Delegate
Norton, but few others. (All territories, including, for instance,
Wyoming, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Washington, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Missouri, Montana, and Alaska, came into the Union on an equal footing
with the other states. While the equal footing doctrine is not
mandated by the constitution, Congress has traditionally employed it
for the admission of new states.)
- Retrocession to Maryland: Pro: It provides for full Congressional
representation for DC residents and local control under the final
authority of the Maryland state legislature, as opposed to Congress.
Con: It has never won the support of the District’s population, or
that of the people of the state of Maryland. A Wirthlin Group poll
conducted in Oct.-Nov. 1994 found that only 19% of DC residents
supported retrocession and only 24% of Marylanders supported the idea. The Maryland
State Legislature would have to ratify any DC retrocession bill passed
by Congress. Moreover, the District’s future political power in
Congress would be substantially diluted by an act of retrocession. The
District would share the Maryland congressional delegation rather than
enjoy one all its own. And the District’s special historical,
political, cultural, and even legal identity, developed painstakingly
and at considerable cost over 200 years, would inevitably be
compromised by absorption into the state of Maryland.
- Voting Rights Amendment: Pro: It would provide for either full
Congressional voting rights or a vote in the House of Representatives
only. Con: It is generally considered more difficult to attain than
statehood, having once already failed to win ratification, garnering
support in only 34% of the requisite state legislatures in 1985. An
amendment for a vote in the House only is considered easier to win
than statehood because it would probably receive the endorsement of
moderate House Republicans such as Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA). Neither
version of the constitutional amendment, however, would guarantee
local governmental autonomy.
Fiscal and Political Deficits
Of the aforementioned remedies, only two guarantee equal constitutional
rights for District residents. If the answer of DC residents to the first
threshold question is that they want equal rights, as opposed to something
less than equal rights, then the other alternative remedies should be set
aside as inadequate. While strategic arguments can certainly be made in
favor of the "less than equal" alternatives — for instance,
that they are a "down payment on statehood" or are a
"stepping stone" to equal constitutional rights — they would
also send a powerful message to the nation that DC residents are willing
to settle for less than political equality, despite bearing equal
responsibilities as US citizens. Is this the message we wish to convey to
the nation? And wouldn’t DC be as unfaithful to the basic principles of
this nation as those who oppose us, should we argue for anything less than
constitutional equality?
Yet the most popular alternatives of DC statehood and Maryland
retrocession appear to be unrealistic. DC cannot apply for statehood
without paying for all of its state functions. But according to Stephen
Fuller, an economist at George Mason University, this scenario is unlikely
to occur any time soon. Describing the long-term, fiscal forecasts of the
city as "not rosy," Fuller comments that the District’s budget
growth is "never going to be enough to reinvest in its capital
structures," estimating that it will require $3 billion alone to
revamp the DC public school system "to make [it] on a par with
Arlington County’s." Further, "[t]here are only 570,000
residents," he adds, "and the city is landlocked, and has only a
certain capacity to increase its tax base." In other words, the
District needs additional revenue sources since "it has squeezed the
maximum out of the ones it has." As to whether or not the District
will ever be able to reclaim its state functions given the dim fiscal
forecasts, Fuller answers the question with a question, "Any sober
person might say, ‘Why would it want to?’"
While the District’s finances are strikingly better off than they
were when the city’s leaders struck a grand bargain with the federal
government in 1997 to save the city from plummeting into bankruptcy, the
consequence of that deal is to have undercut any new petition for
statehood. And while the District’s corrections system and courts could
conceivably be reclaimed somewhere down the road, the hard strategic
questions are: What precisely are the city’s plans to reclaim them and
how long is it likely to take? The viability of any future campaign for DC
statehood hinges on realistic answers to these questions.
DC retrocession is probably an even remoter possibility at this point
than statehood, due to its lack of a requisite core political
constituency, either in Maryland or in DC. For this reason, retrocession
continues to be an orphan remedy, despite the fact that Rep. Ralph Regula
(R-OH) ritualistically introduces a retrocession bill in Congress each
year.
Which brings us to the ultimate, thorny question: If DC residents truly
want to win equal constitutional rights, where do they turn to win the
twin objectives of equal Congressional representation and full
self-government, while recognizing the harsh parameters of the city’s
asthmatic fiscal health?
The Hard Numbers
In a 1997 — at the nadir of the District’s economic downturn —
Mark David Richards conducted a nationally representative telephone survey
of 1,000 US adults (Margin of error is plus or minus 3 percentage points),
asking Americans if they agreed or disagreed that the residents of
Washington, D.C. should have voting representation in the Congress, like
other US citizens. 79% agreed. Importantly, a whopping 87% of those
Americans also agreed that local residents should have the right to elect
their own local officials to run their city government, just like other US
citizens.
Then in 1999 Richards conducted another national poll of US adults that
provided some basic facts about the current situation and asked, "In
your opinion, should DC citizens have equal voting rights in the House and
the Senate, or not?" 72% supported equal voting rights in the House
and the Senate. An underlying belief that all Americans should have equal
political rights is a likely explanation for the high level of public
support. Of those who supported equal voting rights for DC, an
overwhelming 82% said that they would support an equal constitutional
rights amendment. 59% said that they would support merging DC into
Maryland, and 57% said they would support DC statehood.
The equal constitutional rights amendment was also the only remedy of
the three that gained majority support among all demographic groups,
including women, men, liberals, moderates, conservatives, Democrats,
Independents and Republicans. The level of support ranged from 57% for
conservatives to 81% for Democrats.
While the American public is supportive of equal political rights for
DC, it remains conflicted, as does DC itself, over the best means to
remedy the injustice. But the twenty-five percent difference between
support for an amendment for equal constitutional rights and support for
DC statehood is statistically significant and should be carefully
considered in any debate over DC’s long-term strategy.
Local Business & DC Elites
At the heart of the conflict between DC pro-democracy forces lies the
question of whether or not the District will ever be viable as a
self-sustaining state. Historically, the business community, city elites,
and DC voters west of the Rock Creek Park have been wary of inflated
claims that financial independence from the federal government was
practicable, or even beneficial. Without some certainty that the District
can economically survive if the financial crutch of Congress is withdrawn,
those fears are likely to continue in perpetuity, and support for
statehood by those powers will likely go on being denied. Severance of
Congress’s purse strings is the one fiscal nightmare that they truly
dread.
And for good reason. Notwithstanding claims about the District’s
fiscal self-sufficiency from statehood advocates during the statehood
debate in 1993, shortly after the bill was defeated, the city’s
financial roof caved in, resulting in the creation of a financial control
board, and worse, the temporary takeover of the District by the federal
government in 1997. It was self-evident that the city was in no condition
to support statehood. Nor would it have been, even if it had won the right
to negotiate reciprocal taxing agreements with Maryland and Virginia with
statehood. Mismanagement, severe limitations on the city’s taxing
authority, additional burdens imposed on DC by the federal government, and
a razor thin tax base all contributed to the city’s financial demise.
Yet the city’s political agenda demands equal political rights. A
more flexible plan is required to align the legitimate concerns of a
cautious business community with the fundamental aspirations of the
majority of Washingtonians. After all, any successful national campaign
for equal rights will require business’s serious financial commitment,
and city elites and DC voters west of Rock Creek Park are an important
political constituency in any consensus building process.
A Strategic Compromise.
So the big question begs itself: What strategic compromise can
reconcile the imperative of forging a consensus on remedy, the
majoritarian expressed intention to win equal political rights through
statehood, the city’s loss of key state functions, the District’s dim,
long-term, fiscal prospects, Americans’ preference to support an
amendment for equal constitutional rights, and the historical concern of
the local business community and city elites about irrevocably cutting
Congressional purse strings?
Surprisingly, the answer may lie South of the Border, in a region of
the world relatively inexperienced in the ways of democracy, but light
years ahead of the US in solving the problem of the disenfranchisement of
the residents of their own federal districts.
While the citizens of Caracas, Venezuela; Mexico City, Mexico; Buenos
Aires, Argentina, and Brasilia, Brazil — all federal districts and
modeled after America’s own, the District of Columbia — they
nevertheless enjoy full voting rights in their national legislatures. This
was not always the case.
Brasilia, for instance, was founded in 1889 as the capital of the
Federal Republic of Brazil and copying the US example, disenfranchised
those citizens living in its own federal district (FD). They had no
representation in the national legislature and as late as 1969 the
residents of the FD were denied representation in their own local
legislature, as it was governed by a special Senate committee and its
so-called "governor" was appointed by the president with the
consent of the Senate.
Not until Brazil amended its constitution in 1988 were the residents of
the FD treated as citizens of the states, with equal representation
granted them in both chambers of the national legislature. According to
political science professor Charles Wesley Harris of Howard University,
the new constitution not only granted the FD "the same legislative
powers as the states and municipalities," but also endowed it with
"the same taxation and revenue powers (and limitations) as the
state." Moreover, the FD was generally granted budgetary autonomy,
and receives "special payments" as the seat of national
government.
If it works for Brasilia, why not for DC?
In lieu of statehood, why not craft an amendment for equal
constitutional rights for DC residents — a "DC Bill of Rights"
— that would effectively treat DC citizens as residents of a state for
all constitutional intents and purposes? As Professor Harris concludes,
"[w]ith the national constitution providing for the federal district
to be treated as a state, [Brasilia] is strong in both local autonomy and
representation in the…. national congress." If DC statehood is out
of reach for the foreseeable future, shouldn’t we shoot to win DC
residents the very essence of states’ rights?
A "DC Bill of Rights" — as distinct from a voting rights
only amendment — would grant DC residents not only full Congressional
voting rights, but also the same rights, powers, privileges and
protections guaranteed to all other US citizens living in the fifty
states. Under this constitutional design, DC could enjoy full
representation as well as budgetary and legislative autonomy — but
without statehood — even as the federal government would continue to pay
for and run the District’s prison system, courts and its obligations
under Medicaid. This remedy of choice would square the built-in
limitations of our hobbled economic circumstances with our inalienable
right to equal constitutional rights. Moreover, it would ensure the
solvency of the city, putting to rest the concerns of local business, and
others, about the economic stress statehood would inevitably put on the
city’s finances. Furthermore, it should satisfy the principle
imperatives of those statehood advocates who rightfully demand legislative
and budgetary autonomy, as well as full Congressional representation,
while not precluding the eventuality of statehood when the city can retain
and pay for its state functions.
Thus, the amendment for equal constitutional rights, or "DC Bill
of Rights" may be a remedy of choice for all seasons. It is capable
of engendering consensus support across the city by virtue of its
responsiveness to the legitimate concerns of the various factions working
for democracy in DC. And most importantly, it represents the best chance
DC has for gaining the requisite political level of support from the
American public.
Many complex constitutional questions would have to be considered in
drafting an equal rights amendment: Would the 23rd amendment, which grants
DC residents the right to vote in presidential elections, be repealed?
Would a separate National Capital Service Area have to be drawn, composed
exclusively of the federal areas of the city, such as the Congress and the
White House? Would the Federal Height Act of 1910 be affected? Would
Capitol Police have jurisdiction in non-federal jurisdiction areas? And
how would the constitutional tension between Congress’s right to
exercise "exclusive legislation" authority over the District and
DC citizens’ right "to be treated as residents of a state for all
constitutional intents and purposes?" resolve itself in a court of
law?
One thing is certain: Gone would be the days when Congress had the
unfettered right to veto any DC legislation based on a personal whim or
political fancy. Should a legal clash arise between Congress and the city
over any DC legislation, Congress would be required to demonstrate to the
courts that a "compelling national interest" existed — such as
national defense or security — before it could override local law. Of
course, if Congress could demonstrate such a compelling national interest,
Congress’s intervention would probably not be unreasonable. Indeed, DC
residents might even welcome it.
In any event, this is the kind of limited compromise DC residents
should consider making, given the fact that the federal government does
have legitimate national interests in the nation’s capital. The big
difference between life under an amendment and life now is that our local
interests would be protected on a basis equal to all other US citizens
living in the states. Even if the same right to legislative and/or
budgetary autonomy could be won by statute, it could be overturned at the
sole discretion of Congress. A profound change in the constitution is the
only way — short of statehood — that will guarantee political equality
for all District residents.
The Amendment Text
For purposes of discussion, the language of an amendment for equal
constitutional rights might read as follows:
Section 1. All US citizens residing in the non-federal areas of the
District of Columbia shall be treated as residents of a state for all
constitutional intents and purposes, and shall enjoy those same rights,
powers and privileges, including:
equal representation in the House of Representatives under Article 1
equal representation in the US Senate under the 17th amendment
the right to a republican form of government under Article 4
the right to all powers and privileges under the 9th and 10th
amendments
equal protection under the 14th amendment.
Section 2. Congress shall limit its power to exercise its
"exclusive legislation" over the District of Columbia under
Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 17 of the constitution to the following
geographical areas, except in the case of a compelling national interest:
all federal buildings and properties, and the National Park Service
areas
all foreign embassies and missions.
Section 3. The Federal Height Act of 1910 shall remain in full force
and effect.
Section 4. All other federal laws shall apply to the District of
Columbia, as if it was a state.
Section 5. General services may be provided to the federal government
by the government of the District of Columbia on an as needed basis on
such terms as are mutually satisfactory to the parties. The federal
government shall have jurisdiction over and provide for the District of
Columbia’s courts and correctional facilities until such time as the
District becomes a state.
Section 6. Nothing shall prevent the federal government from
compensating the District of Columbia in the form of payment in lieu of
taxes for revenues foregone as the seat of national government.
Section 7. The 23rd amendment shall be repealed concurrently with the
passage of this amendment.
Section 8. Nothing in this amendment shall prohibit the District of
Columbia from becoming a state in due course. At such time as the District
becomes a state, this amendment shall become null and void. The Congress
shall have the power to enforce these articles by appropriate legislation.
Obviously, the passage of such a sweeping constitutional amendment will
be reliant on the majority support of, shall we say, a more progressive
Congress than the one currently in power. But in light of the significant
national support for the amendment concept, as demonstrated in recent
polls, the established precedent of an amendment for DC rights once before
having been passed with at least a measure of bi-partisan support in
Congress, and the inherent difficulty of convincing America that a city--
the nation’s capital in fact -- should be made into a state, it is at
least arguable that the strategic advantage shifts in an amendment’s
favor. However, to begin with, the idea should be tested for traction with
the current Democratic Congressional leadership.
Lessons Learned
Why should a "DC Bill of Rights" fair any better in the
national marketplace of political ideas than the ill-fated and more
limited 1978 amendment? A review of the key factors that contributed to
the latter’s downfall sheds light on the deficits of the old campaign
and provides valuable lessons for any future undertaking.
According to Professor Harris, the principle reason for the failure of
the voting rights amendment was that "no effective national campaign
ever materialized" and the unsuccessful one that was mounted
"was plagued by inadequate funds." As a result, DC advocates
were overwhelmed and outmaneuvered by political opponents, incapable of
countering their specious but nevertheless effective arguments: "Our
Founding Fathers never intended for DC to vote in Congress." ;
"Voting rights are a raw grab for partisan power." ; "Many
cities have populations larger than DC’s and they don’t have their own
senators and congresspersons."
Adding to the difficulty of mounting a national campaign from a minute
political base was the fact that support for the voting rights amendment
at the local level was fractured. For instance, the DC Statehood Party was
opposed to the amendment because it fell short of its demand for both
voting rights and local autonomy. Moreover, efforts to build a strong
local coalition were, in the words of Professor Harris, only
"partially successful." The campaign’s leadership was for a
time divided between two competing camps. Also the local business
community, "a prime source of necessary funds had not been
effectively enlisted as an equal partner."
Shockingly, Congressional members who helped steer the amendment
through Congress were scarcely involved in the national campaign, though
they had access to political networks within their own states that should
have been put to work. Lastly, the campaign failed to capitalize on key
bi-partisan support from such central Republican Party figures as Senator
Bob Dole of Kansas, Republican Party chairman Bill Brock, and Rep. Stewart
McKinney of Connecticut. As it became increasingly clear that the campaign
was facing improbable odds, DC leaders switched gears, putting their hopes
on a new campaign for statehood. A sea change in strategic thinking had
occurred. The campaign had failed.
A Paradigm Shift
Without a paradigm shift in DC’s strategic thinking, any new campaign
for equal rights is likely to suffer the same fate as all those that have
come before. The passage of an amendment for equal constitutional rights,
or a "DC Bill of Rights", will require a degree of political
sophistication and financial commitment unprecedented in the annals of DC’s
historical campaign for basic equality. It must be far more scientific,
applying mainstream sales tools commonly employed by Madison Avenue for
promoting everything from the presidency to Bayer Aspirin.
Among other things, message testing should be done, and a television,
radio and print campaign must be generated based on the most effective
message found. Advertisements then need to be tested before being taken
into prime time. And media counter- messages must also be developed to
answer opponents arguments. Those opposing the last amendment instructed
their supporters not to argue on the merits of equality, but to argue
against the remedy. Armed with a war chest of tested messages and
counter-messages, DC will have its best shot at seizing the brass ring.
To accomplish this, serious funds will need to be raised—in the
several millions. Only the DC business community has the capability of
contributing at the requisite high levels. National civil rights and labor
groups, while critical to generating support at the grassroots and
legislative level, cannot be relied upon to finance a national campaign.
But in order to win the commitment of the business community, they must
first buy into the strategic plan. The amendment offers that prospect.
Moreover, any amendment for equal constitutional rights will also have
to rely on the steadfast support of the Washington Post. According
to Sen. Ted Stevens, the Alaskan statehood campaign garnered the support
of 80% of the American public because of the commitment on the part of
Alaska’s major newspaper publishers to lobby "publishers of
dailies, of weeklies, of monthly papers, magazine publishers of all
descriptions, those who broadcast the news in movie houses, and on
television, and on radio." This is a must.
In addition, DC’s issue must be internationalized. The fact that DC
residents are the only residents of a federal district in the Americas
that are denied voting representation is a strategic tool of potentially
monumental importance. It should be made excruciatingly awkward for the
American government to proselytize on behalf of human rights around the
globe and yet deny such basic rights as voting to the citizens of its own
capital city. The case still pending before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights of the Organization of America States may end up exposing
this disparate and ultra-hypocritical treatment of DC residents on the
world stage, creating a stinging source of consternation for America,
which may help prompt national action on resolving this egregious wrong in
an expedited manner. This contradiction between principle and behavior may
yet represent America’s political Achilles’ heel on DC rights.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, DC residents must become far more
involved in the campaign for political equality. Currently, a feeling that
DC can’t succeed saps the energy of DC residents. An historical victim
mentality persists. When the time comes, local residents have a moral
mandate to be marching in the streets, lobbying on Capitol Hill, meeting
with state legislators, and speaking up. Unless the American public
perceives that DC really cares, why should they?
Whether or not the stars will align at precisely the right time is
anyone’s guess. But before we can even begin to work for that, city
leaders, citizens, and local businesses must reach a consensus about how
to proceed. And while the resurrection of a constitutional amendment
strategy will naturally be met with resistance, it may be worth noting
Professor Charles Harris’s most eloquent statement on the art of the
possible: "The art of forging compromises and the revisitation of
issues and problems due to changed circumstances are primary ingredients
of US politics and public policy. As legislators come and go and
coalitions form and dissolve around issues and problems, what is rejected
or vetoed at one time may be approved at another." This may be the
time.
In Conclusion
Imagine for a moment the Indian independence movement which ousted the
British Empire from Indian soil in the 20th century. Imagine Mahatma
Gandhi, on the one hand, advocating for the complete independence of
India; Hindu leader Pandit Nehru, on the other hand, advocating for
limited home rule; and Muslim leader Mohamed Ali Jinnah advocating for the
creation of a separate Islamic state—all at the same time. Until the
people of the District reach an unshakeable consensus on their next major
strategic move, the DC democracy movement will have about as much chance
of succeeding as the Indian independence movement would have under those
imaginary conditions. Consensus is strength.
The late great statehood advocate, Josephine Butler, once said that
true revolution takes revolutionary patience. To accomplish what no other
generation has ever done before, we must, on the one hand, continue to be
visibly impatient with the status of our circumstances; yet, on the other
hand, we must be truly patient with each other—for in the end, the
campaign for DC political equality will only be won through consensus.
The writer is the executive director of Democracy First
4101 Davenport St., NW
202/244-9479/ 202 361-0989
worldright@aol.com |